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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (16 Feb 70)

FOR OT UT 70B007

24 February 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG J. S. Timothy, Deputy  
Senior Advisor, II Corps, Period December 1968 to December  
1969 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG J. S. Timothy, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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as


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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375**

AVHGC-DST

01 Feb 1970

**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report  
BG J. S. Timothy**

**Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C. 20310**

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG J. S. Timothy. BG Timothy served as Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps during the period December 1968 to December 1969.
2. BG Timothy is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

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as (trip)  
2 cy wd HQ, DA

  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP  
II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE  
APO San Francisco 96318

MACTN-IIC-DS4

2 December 1969

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, DSA, II CTZ

Commanding General  
US Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHCG-DST  
APO 96375

1. Subject report, prepared in accordance with Reg No 1-3, Hqs, USAFV, dated 1 June 1968, is attached.
2. Departing Vietnam for the second time as DSA, II Corps Tactical Zone, I regret that I am not as enthusiastic about the successful resolution of this fight as I was when I left in July 1966. II Corps ARVN troops have made visible, measurable progress in the past three and one-half years; the question is -- have they made enough progress faced with "Vietnamization" accompanied by the US pull out?
3. The force structure increase has put more troops in the field, but the dilution of scarce leaders to man the added forces has meant that the high expectations for overall improvement in combat effectiveness have been disappointing. The biggest boost to ARVN fighting ability has been the provision of improved means to "shoot, move, and communicate" -- resulting from the supply of the M-16, modern US trucks, and the new US family of radios. Provision of the foregoing assets to RF/PF has given these troops materiel parity with the VC, and they are starting, belatedly, to get out of their mud forts to "wrestle". Next in importance in improving the fighting ability of II Corps ARVN troops has been the increasing helicopter assets that CG, I Field Force, Vietnam has provided in their support accompanied by required training in airmobile operations and the employment of air cavalry assets. ARVN must quit their leisurely "sweeps" and casually pressed reactions if they hope to escape emasculation as we phase out of here. Instead, they must rapidly come up with an effective airmobile capability on a par with US troops in the conduct of "Eagle Flight" and "Jitterbug" operations.
4. The fundamental, persistent, and most debilitating weakness of ARVN is their lack of strong leadership at all levels. Perhaps they can turn out "tigers", but I have seen only a handful. This is not a particularly flattering commentary

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
SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, DSA, II CTZ

as it relates to our advisory effort -- especially since the other side appears to be able to turn out some pretty courageous, hard-hitting, dedicated soldiers. We must, therefore, support any strategem to build up leadership in ARVN; present methods don't "cut it". The second glaring weakness among ARVN personnel is their poor, haphazard staff work -- observed at first hand. This stems from either ignorance, poor training, or lack of demanding leaders. I suspect a combination of the latter two reasons. Again, means must be found to produce effective staffs at the regimental level and below if we expect decent planning and management -- especially in the control of US combat support assets.

5. One final word as relates to the advisory effort. To effectively implement our "Vietnamization" policy with sanguine expectation for the survival of ARVN after we phase out, we must upgrade the quality of our advisors as well as their preparatory training. The record of officers "excused" from my advisory group during the past year and those passed over for promotion bears eloquent testimony to the quality of some officers received. Other than the officers I have "promoted" from US units in country, I have yet to receive one lieutenant colonel with combat experience with US units in Vietnam for the vitally important jobs of regimental advisor and corps and division G3 advisors. Another critical area is the lack of experienced, trained intelligence advisors at all levels. With respect to training, suffice to say that I have been forced to send my combat arms advisors to the 4th Division for training because of their lack of applicable preparatory training in the States. The obvious solution for upgrading the ARVN advisory effort is to give them priority above or at least equal to that accorded US troops in Vietnam.

## 7 Incl

1. Annex A -- Intelligence
2. Annex B -- Operations
3. Annex C -- Organization and Training
4. Annex D -- Artillery
5. Annex E -- Personnel
6. Annex F -- Logistics
7. Annex G -- Political Warfare

  
J. S. TIMOTHY  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Senior Advisor

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## ANNEX A (Intelligence)

1. GENERAL. The counterinsurgency war in Vietnam has seen the emergence of intelligence acquisition become the dominant factor in the conduct of operations. This is because we are fighting an enemy highly experienced in the art of guerrilla warfare, who seeks to fight only on his own terms, and who exploits fully his agent nets, his sanctuaries, and the varied and difficult terrain. The US Army has introduced in Vietnam many new and sophisticated intelligence collection and target acquisition techniques to supplement the traditional sources of information: prisoners of war, captured documents, defectors, voluntary informants, and controlled agents. Although the technical collection assets are controlled by US Forces, ARVN personnel have been integrated into the programs and will eventually acquire the proficiency for independent control and operation. Resources devoted to intelligence collection have been effective in providing timely information on the enemy and his probable intentions; however, the ARVN reaction to this intelligence has not been equally as effective. The intelligence is available, but it requires the constant urging of ARVN commanders to exploit it in a timely manner. The major advisory effort is focused on ARVN development of sound planning methods, not only to collect intelligence but also to exploit it effectively. II Corps has made substantive progress in the establishment of a professional combat intelligence structure during the past year.

## 2. THE ENEMY.

a. Organization, Command, and Control. The enemy organization within II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) is based on four geographical divisions: Military Region 5 (Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa Provinces), Military Region 6 (Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong Provinces), Military Region 10 (Quang Duc Province), and the B3 Front (Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, and Darlac Provinces). (See Inclosure 1, Annex A.) Only the B3 Front is located entirely within the geographical area of II Corps. MR 5 controls some areas in I Corps, while MR 6 and MR 10 control some areas in III Corps, in addition to their areas in II Corps. The B3 Front and the Military Regions control the military operations of NVA and Main Force (MF) units in their respective areas. The Viet Cong Provincial Party Committees control the operation of Local Force (LF) battalions in their respective provinces, while the District Party Committees control the operations of LF companies and guerrilla units in their districts.

(1) MR5 controls the 3d NVA Division, the 240th Transportation Regt, and the Southern Sub-Region (SSR) Headquarters (Khanh Hoa Province)

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within II CTZ. Although the 3d NVA Division and its 2d and 22d Regts are normally based in southern I Corps, the Division's 18th NVA Regt operates exclusively in II Corps. In October 1969 elements of the 2d and 22d Regts moved from I Corps into northern Binh Dinh Province in II Corps. During 1969, the 300th MF Bn, formerly subordinate to MR 5, was placed under control of the Phu Yen Province Party Committee. The E10 NVA Regt, formed in early 1969 in Phu Yen Province and subordinate to SSR Headquarters, was disbanded in June 1969, and its three battalions were transferred. The regiment's 12th Bn moved from Phu Yen to Khanh Hoa Province and is believed to be still subordinate to SSR Headquarters. The 11th Bn combined with the 85th LF Bn to form the 96th Group and became subordinate to the Phu Yen Provincial Party Committee. The 13th Bn also became subordinate to the Phu Yen Provincial Committee. SSR Headquarters continues to control the 95th Arty Bn and the 407th Sapper Bn located in Khanh Hoa Province.

(2) The organization of MR 6 which controls four MF Bns, one NVA Bn, and three LF Bns has remained unchanged throughout the year. The 186th and 840th MF Bns and the 240th NVA Bn are located in Binh Thuan Province, together with the 481st, 482d A, and 482d B LF Bns, the 14th MF Bn, and 810th LF Bn are located in Tuyen Duc Province, while the 307th MF Bn operates in Ninh Thuan Province.

(3) Although Quang Duc Province is the only II CTZ province controlled by MR 10, little is known of the organization or control exercised by that headquarters. It is suspected that it controls the D251st Mobile Bn and some transportation units within the province. Beginning in August 1969, major maneuver elements (28th and 66th NVA Inf Regts and elements of the 40th NVA Arty Regt) under the control of the B3 Front moved into the area along the Cambodian border adjacent to Quang Duc Province and Phuoc Long Province in III Corps. Offensive actions against Bu Prang CIDG Camp and Duc Lap District Headquarters, both in Quang Duc Province, began on 28 October 1969. However, there is no indication that MR 10 was involved in these operations; complete command and control apparently was exercised by B3 Front. However, PWs captured during the Bu Prang action stated that all supplies for NVA troops in Quang Duc were provided by MR 10.

(4) In December 1968, B3 Front controlled four NVA infantry regiments (24th, 66th, 101D, 95B), the 40th NVA Arty Regt, and the 250th NVA Transportation Regt. Combat support battalions included the K25A and K25B Engineer Bns, 28th Recon Bn, and the K37 and K20 Sapper Bns. There were also two independent infantry battalions, the 966th and K39th. During 1969 the 101D Inf Regt moved into III Corps and the 28th NVA Inf Regt moved into II Corps from the Khe Sanh area in I Corps. With the exceptions noted above, the same major NVA elements were still under the control of B3 Front a year later (See Inclosure 2, Annex A). In addition, two infantry battalions, the 966th and K39th, combined with two artillery battalions, the K31st and K34th, and were redesignated the 631st and 394th Arty/Inf Bns, respectively.

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(5) There were several significant changes in the enemy's organization within II Corps during the period December 1968 to December 1969:

(a) In two instances NVA battalions were separated from their parent regiments, resubordinated to Provincial Party Committees, and given new designations. The first was noted in June 1969 when the 5th Bn, 24th Regt became subordinate to the Kontum Province Party Committee and was redesignated the 94th Group. As previously noted, when the 11th Bn, E10 NVA Regt was combined with the 85th LF Bn in July it was redesignated the 96th Group under control of the Phu Yen Province Party Committee. In addition, the 300th MF Bn, previously controlled by MR5, was subordinated to the Phu Yen Province Party Committee. The rationale for these changes is not known; however, it is reasoned that Hanoi might desire to reduce its overt presence within II CTZ by combining NVA with LF units in the event future negotiations with the Allies focus on the withdrawal of NVA units from South Vietnam. With the majority of NVA units operating from Cambodian sanctuaries, the enemy could then announce that there are no NVA units within South Vietnam, but only local communist forces and guerrillas. Another possibility is that the pacification program has made such inroads on communist control that this is an attempt to strengthen local force units and at the same time assure NVA domination of local forces in the event of a "cease fire" agreement and a future coalition government in South Vietnam.

(b) Another significant development during the period was the combining of two separate infantry battalions and two separate artillery battalions to form two composite artillery/infantry battalions. The K39 Inf Bn combined with the K34 Arty Bn to form the 394th Arty/Inf Bn in Quang Duc Province; the 966th Inf Bn combined with the K31 Arty Bn to form the 631st Arty/Inf Bn in Pleiku Province. Both units are under the control of B3 Front. This appears to be an economy of force move as it reduces the manpower requirements for headquarters and support elements. It also allows for versatility in deployment of company or platoon size infantry/artillery task forces together with a sapper squad or platoon.

(c) A third significant development during the period also appears to be an economy of forces measure. This concerns the enemy's increased reversion to guerrilla tactics and small unit operations against larger Allied forces. Related thereto was a marked acceleration of sapper training in all units during the last eight months of 1969.

(d) The enemy has undoubtedly been forced to adopt the foregoing economy of force measures as a result of heavy losses sustained by major combat units whenever committed in battalion or larger size formations as well as their lack of success in recruiting within South Vietnam. Relative successes achieved by small sapper units in 1969 against POL and munitions storage areas in Qui Nhon, against the Lam Son National Training Center in Khanh Hoa Province, against a helicopter unit based at An Khe, and against

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an asphalt plant near Kontum City highlighted the fact that elite, well-trained, small units can do substantial damage to allied personnel and installations.

### b. Strategy and Tactics.

(1) Enemy strategy changed somewhat during 1969 as a result of heavy losses suffered on the battlefield, the progress of the GVN pacification program, and the increased effectiveness of ARVN forces. With the exceptions of the Chu Pa Campaign in January-February, the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign during May-July, and the Bu Prang - Duc Lap Campaign in October-November, the enemy resorted to an economy of force strategy throughout II CTZ. Main units avoided contact, while the enemy stressed the necessity to revert to small unit operations and guerrilla tactics. Strong emphasis was placed on sapper training. Each infantry battalion was ordered to have one company organized and trained as a sapper unit while the other companies were prepared to employ sapper tactics. Each district was ordered to organize a sapper platoon and each hamlet a sapper squad. These latter units could include women as well as men. The enemy's principal strategy was to intensify political activity at all levels from hamlet to province. This activity was to be closely coordinated with military operations and supplemented by military and civilian proselyting. ARVN forces were the primary target of proselyting in an attempt to lure them away from the GVN, destroy their confidence in ARVN leaders, encourage desertions, and cause friction between ARVN and FVMAF.

(2) In the northern coastal provinces of II CTZ, local force and main force units reorganized into squad size elements to operate with district, village, and hamlet VC in conducting concerted attacks against all elements involved in the GVN pacification program. These actions consisted of low-level harassment against allied units, mining and interdiction of principal LOCs, assassinations, abductions, and other forms of terrorism designed to instill fear in the populace and discredit the capability of the GVN to protect its citizens. Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa Provinces, the most populous areas in II CTZ, experienced the most fierce VC/NVA attempts to disrupt pacification efforts and to retain some control over the population.

(3) Noteworthy among the enemy's battlefield tactics was the increased employment of B40 and B41 rockets in ambushes and LOC interdiction as well as on the battlefield. In the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign, elements of the 28th and 66th NVA Regts used these weapons in unprecedented numbers, both in initiating and breaking contact. This indicates that major maneuver forces on a prepared battlefield receive an augmentation of these weapons. The B40 and B41 accounted for the majority of ARVN casualties during the year. There was also a trend to employ these weapons against low-flying aircraft.

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(4) An enemy tactical ploy noted during the Ben Het Campaign was the rapid movement of forces into the strike area immediately following a B52 bombing raid. Ambushes were then organized against friendly BDA teams that attempted to survey the area.

(5) A matter of increasing concern is the enemy's accelerated employment of CS gas in 82mm mortar attacks, not only during large scale operations but also in harassing attacks against small outposts.

### c. Armament.

(1) The most widely used small arms weapons in the VC/NVA inventory is the AK 47 assault rifle which has gradually replaced the SKS, CKC, and homemade weapons of the past. The enemy also employs captured M-16 rifles, M-60 machineguns, and M79 grenade launchers.

(2) 60mm and 82mm mortars and the 57mm and 45mm recoilless rifles are the most frequently used weapons in stand-off attacks. Except for the appearance of the 122mm rocket in the coastal province of Binh Dinh, in addition to its normal use in the Highlands, enemy artillery capabilities and employment changed little. While 107mm and 140mm rockets appeared throughout the II CTZ, the employment of field artillery (105mm How and 85mm Gun) and 120mm mortars have normally been confined to areas in or adjacent to Cambodia.

(3) The most frequently noted anti-aircraft weapon employed in II CTZ has been the 12.7mm AA MG, although the enemy has on rare occasions employed the 37mm AA Gun.

(4) In a very unusual move, the enemy employed PT76 tanks in the Ben Het Campaign in May 1969. They were quickly destroyed by allied fire power. There were periodic, yet unconfirmed, reports of tank sightings along the Cambodian border from Kontum to Quang Duc Province during the year.

### d. Logistics.

(1) The enemy has two complementary logistics organizations. One is through the military and the other through the political chain of command, with both systems controlled by the Lao Dong Central Executive Committee in Hanoi. The political side is responsible for obtaining supplies, taxes, and labor for transport, while the military is responsible for distributing supplies to the troops. This system did not change in 1969.

(2) With the exception of weapons and other ordnance -- the vast bulk of which is infiltrated from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia -- most of the enemy's supplies and financial support came from within South Vietnam. The majority of the sophisticated war materials introduced into II CTZ is produced in the USSR, Eastern Europe, or in Communist China.

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During 1969 it was noted that large shipments of weapons and ammunition into II CTZ were arriving via sampan and truck through Cambodia. The main sampan route was from Stung Treng to Bo Kham which is near NVA Base Area 702 on the border of Pleiku Province. A truck route also originated at Stung Treng and went via Bo Kheo to Bo Kham. The other truck route originated at Kratie and terminated at Camp le Rolland near Bu Prang in Quang Duc Province. (See Inclosure 3, Annex A.)

(3) Most of the enemy's food in II CTZ is procured in the Coastal provinces or produced in remote areas cultivated by VC/NVA units. Some rice and manioc is infiltrated through Cambodia. Food and medical supplies were in critical shortages throughout 1969, and almost every unit was ordered to assign personnel to rice production. Allied operations and crop destruction programs severely hindered the enemy's food growing operations. To meet his requirements, the enemy increased food collection activities in hamlets and villages and resorted to purchasing supplies in open markets throughout II CTZ.

(4) The enemy's main source of income is taxation. During 1969 his taxation efforts were extensive, systematic, and sophisticated. He appeared to have little difficulty in collecting high percentages of crops in rural areas principally because VC controlled areas are located in farming areas. The amount of taxes levied was based on a VC assessment of what the acreage ought to produce, rather than on the actual yield. Transportation taxes were collected by teams at mobile collection points established on major LOCs. Special taxes were levied during harvest time and before major offensive efforts. Despite the large agricultural and financial taxes extracted by the enemy, many units in the provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, and the Western Highlands were forced to increase the number of troops employed in food production and transportation. This lowered the combat effectiveness of his forces and caused a serious deterioration in troop morale.

### e. Transportation.

(1) There were no significant changes or developments in the enemy's transportation system within II CTZ during the period. The three major transportation or infiltration routes in II CTZ continued to operate. These routes are depicted at Inclosure 4, Annex A.

(2) Supplies are moved into I and II Corps using vehicles and porters. From Cambodia supplies are transported primarily by porters. Once within II CTZ, supplies are transported by the individual soldier, by impressed laborers, by animals, by bicycles, and occasionally by motor vehicles. The enemy had the capability of infiltrating supplies along the II CTZ coastal provinces; however, captured documents and ralliers indicated little success in infiltration by sea during 1969.

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### f. Communications.

(1) The enemy maintains a broad and effective radio communications network throughout II CTZ. It is partially limited by the requirement that it be mobile, but coordination and control appeared to be well established and regulated during tactical operations.

(2) Most of the communications equipment utilized by the enemy comes from Communist China and the Soviet Union. However, VC/NVA forces also use equipment from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and captured US equipment. The most common items include the Chicom 63 radio, the Chicom 102E radio, the Chicom 71B radio, the Chicom 0743 telephone, and the Chicom 102E switchboard. In addition to the standard communist manufactured items, the VC/NVA manufacture many simple, homemade varieties of receivers and transmitters.

(3) Within the Viet Cong Province Committee structure, communication personnel serve as couriers and deliver coded orders and communications to LF units.

### g. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) The intelligence organization of the enemy is professional and highly successful, as evidenced by one widespread espionage network of over fifty agents discovered by the GVN in July 1969. The network extended even into the office of the President of the GVN. Further, it is known that the enemy has infiltrated agents into the ARVN, RF/PF, and PSDF, but the extent cannot be estimated. Allied bases have also been penetrated by espionage agents, often under the guise of maids and civilian laborers. The usual tactic against the RF/PF and PSDF is for an agent to establish himself as a member of these forces and at an appropriate time, designed to gain the most psychological impact on the populace, arrange with enemy forces for an ambush of his unit. Such operations normally result in heavy friendly casualties, plus the loss of weapons, radios, and other equipment. However, the most significant gain for the enemy from these attacks is the erosion of the confidence of the populace in the ability of the RF/PF and PSDF to protect them.

(2) The capability of the enemy's intelligence organization has been observed in the operations of his reconnaissance and military intelligence units. These units are skilled and thorough and have provided critical information for both the offensive and defensive maneuvers. In several instances during 1969 in II CTZ, it has been noted that enemy forces have moved just prior to a B-52 strike, indicating that they had received an advance tip-off of the raid. Routine allied patterns of activity have normally met with successful enemy reactions, often by ambushes. Viet Cong intelligence methods and operations parallel those of the Soviet Union in their aggressiveness and scope. Low level agents are targeted against all GVN organizations in shotgun style and attain considerable short range successes. Long range intelligence operations receive equal atten-

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tion. For example, recently captured documents have revealed the Viet Cong plan to recruit five children under the age of fifteen from each village in II CTZ to be sent to North Vietnam for education and training. If this quota could be met, approximately 3000 youths from II CTZ would become future intelligence cadres for the Viet Cong.

(3) Enemy counterintelligence operations are aggressive and thorough, but result in casualties within their own forces because of the inherent suspicion and overcautiousness characteristic of all communist structures. The success of the "Hoi Chanh" or "Rallier" program has heightened the suspicion of the Viet Cong of its members at all levels within the military and the infrastructure.

(4) There have been several instances within II CTZ during 1969 that indicate that the enemy has a considerable capability for exploiting communication intelligence and employing communications deception. He has intruded very skillfully into allied tactical communications nets in attempts to bring fire upon friendly elements. The enemy's exploitation of this critical source of intelligence is expected to grow and advance in sophistication.

### h. Psywar Activities.

(1) The enemy has an extensive organization for psychological operations designed to cover every stratum of Vietnamese society. The principal objectives of his propaganda activity in II Corps during 1969 were:

(a) To discredit the GVN in all facets of its pacification program and ability to govern.

(b) To gain credence and stature for its claimed victory over the US and allied forces by emphasizing that it has forced the US to withdraw its defeated troops from Vietnam.

(c) To foment dissension between ARVN and FVMAF elements; and between ARVN soldiers and their own leaders.

(d) To foment and exploit discontent and grievances of the Negro soldier within US forces in Vietnam.

(e) To increase and accelerate, by whatever means, the discontent of those segments of US society opposed to the war in Vietnam.

(2) Captured documents and the statements of POWs and ralliers have attested to the enemy's concentrated efforts to win the battle for the minds of the South Vietnamese people. Military and civilian proselyting organizations have been increasingly tasked to combine and



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coordinate their efforts with military, political, and diplomatic offensives to convince the South Vietnamese people that their only hope for the future resides in the unification of Vietnam under the aegis of the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

(3) An effective technique increasingly utilized by the enemy in II CTZ has been the employment of armed propaganda teams. These teams enter hamlets and villages at opportune times to deliver propaganda lectures, occasionally combined with assassinations and/or abductions. An interesting reversal of form in the employment of armed propaganda teams occurred in Lam Dong Province in November when a propaganda lecture was accompanied by gratuitous plague immunization shots for the hamlet residents. This could be a significant indicator of the success of the GVN pacification program, insofar as the enemy may realize that the humanitarian approach as practiced by the GVN and its allies may be more effective with the people than his current policy of fear and terror.

(4) A weakness in the enemy's internal propaganda has been his tendency to emphasize and grossly exaggerate military losses inflicted on allied forces. This was usually accompanied by a disproportionate emphasis on the weakness and lack of leadership of communist cadre and sympathizers in carrying out the Viet Cong objectives. Even the most fanatic devotees of the Viet Cong program could find cause to question the disparity in these evaluations, particularly when they have no tangible evidence of significant successes on the battlefield.

## 3. ARVN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE.

### a. Organization.

(1) The ARVN G2 Section at II CTZ Headquarters consists of a Staff Section, a Military Intelligence Detachment, and a Corps Interrogation Center. The Military Intelligence Detachment is divided into functional sub-sections to process information pertaining to Order of Battle, G2 Air, Document Exploitation, Imagery Interpretation, and Agent Nets. In addition, an Intelligence Platoon is under the control of the Corps Military Intelligence Detachment and is utilized on special missions directed by G2 II Corps. There is no counterintelligence capability at any level within the ARVN military intelligence organization.

(2) At the division level, the G2 Staff and the Military Intelligence Detachment are organized along similar lines as the Corps Staff and MID. It has an IPW Section and a Section for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols in addition to the OB, G2 Air, Agent Nets, Document Exploitation, and Imagery Interpretation Sections.

(3) At the regimental level, the S2 Staff is composed of only two officers and two NCOs. They operate an OB Section, an IPW/Document

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Section, an Agent Nets Section, and a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Section. At battalion level there is one officer, the S2, and one NCO assistant. The principal concern of the S2 at battalion level is the interrogation of POWs and the exploitation of captured documents.

## b. Intelligence Collection.

(1) General. In December 1968 ARVN intelligence collection throughout II CTZ lacked uniformity and general direction. Each DTA and STZ intelligence unit performed more or less independently of G2 II Corps. This resulted in an uncoordinated, unresponsive, reactive intelligence collection effort. Only on rare occasions was an aggressive intelligence targeting and collection effort noted, despite the urging of advisors, until the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign in May and June 1969 accentuated the glaring weaknesses in the ARVN intelligence effort. A detailed analysis of these shortcomings, and recommendations for their correction, were presented by this headquarters to the Corps Commander. Since that time steady progress has been made in all intelligence areas within II Corps.

(2) Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance as a technique of intelligence collection and target acquisition was performed almost exclusively by US personnel in December 1968. Since aircraft assets were allocated to Province Senior Advisors, II Corps Tactical units were limited in obtaining practical experience in this mode of collecting intelligence. Nevertheless, periodic classes for ARVN aerial observers were conducted in Pleiku and Qui Nhon throughout the year. Advisory personnel have also trained ARVN personnel and have taken them on aerial reconnaissance missions to provide practical experience. When ARVN eventually assumes control of aerial reconnaissance, they will have a nucleus of trained aerial observers at the Province, Division, and Corps levels.

(3) Photo Reconnaissance. In December 1969, the Advisors in II Corps performed most of the mechanics in processing ARVN photo mission requests to the US Air Force. As a step toward "Vietnamizing" this function, the ARVN G2 Air at Division now initiates photo mission requests to G2 Air at II Corps who controls the mission, assures that there is no duplication, and requests the mission through G2 Air I Field Force to the US Air Force. The results are passed back to Division through G2 Air II Corps. Accordingly, the US advisory chain is now completely divorced from the mechanics of the photo reconnaissance system.

(4) Infra-Red (Red Haze) Photography. Red Haze missions to detect enemy locations by sensing their cooking fires are flown by the US Army and Air Force. ARVN has increasingly requested Red Haze missions during the past year. Requests are handled independently by G2 Air at Division and Corps level in a manner similar to that for photo reconnaissance missions as described above.

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(5) Hand Held Photography. The Hand Held Camera Program operates in conjunction with the Visual Reconnaissance Program. An observer in an Ol-E aircraft photographs pre-planned targets or targets of opportunity with a 35mm camera. During 1969, 24 ARVN personnel were trained in this technique at II Corps Headquarters and in Nha Trang. This intelligence collection technique provides a commander with a faster and more responsive means to develop a target than the normal photo reconnaissance missions. Qualified ARVN Hand Held Camera aerial photographers are currently available in all provinces and in each DTA and STZ in II CTZ.

(6) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR). SLAR flights are currently conducted in II Corps on an automatic, twice-daily basis along the international borders. The readouts on any moving target indicators are integrated into the ARVN collection system. II Corps can request SLAR coverage of any other areas where enemy vehicular movement is suspected.

(7) Ground Sensor Program.

(a) Extensive planning began in early 1969 to integrate ARVN into the ground sensor program, called the TIGHT JAW Program. The objective was to provide for a gradual expansion in ARVN training and operational capability in the use of specialized sensors, ancillary devices, and related equipment commensurate with the tactical need and the ability of ARVN to operate and exploit the program independently. The program was inaugurated in II CTZ on 20 September 1969 and was divided into three phases: PHASE I; from 20 September to 3 October, consisted of formal classroom instruction, practical application, and field exercises. PHASE II consisted of OJT with the 4th US Infantry Division from 4 to 11 October 1969. ARVN personnel participated in actual sensor emplacements, in operating the monitoring sites, and in requesting artillery fire on areas where the sensors were activated. PHASE III began on 12 October 1969 when ARVN personnel returned to their parent units to establish the TIGHT JAW Program in the 23d Division and in the 24th Special Tactical Zone.

(b) Emplacement and monitoring sites were selected in the 24th Special Tactical Zone and the sensors were emplaced on 16 November 1969. The 23d Division became engaged in major tactical operations with the enemy in late October 1969 and temporarily deferred their TIGHT JAW Program. It is expected that the TIGHT JAW Program will eventually produce significant results because of its manifest success in the 4th US Division and because it has the strong support of senior ARVN commanders.

(8) Controlled Agents. Very little is known about the unilaterally controlled intelligence agents of ARVN II Corps units. Intelligence information passed to advisors which is based on ARVN agent reports never identifies nor even alludes to the source of the information. Nothing is known concerning ARVN clandestine agent recruiting procedures, vetting techniques, payments, contacts, or control. Since several US agencies in Vietnam also

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conduct unilateral clandestine agent operations without revealing the agents' identities to ARVN, it is assumed that there could be some resentment on the part of ARVN to share information on their controlled agents. There are no hard facts to support this assumption other than the dearth of information attributable to these sources.

### (9) POW Interrogation.

(a) In December 1968 the ARVN II Corps IPW Section was understaffed and had to confine its operations to three cramped rooms. Although the IPW personnel were well-trained and competent, these environmental conditions caused severe limitations on their productive capability. Only 5 to 10 prisoners were interrogated per month; thus timely information and exploitation opportunities were lost because of this situation.

(b) Strong advisory support resulted in the construction of the II Corps Interrogation Center, a modern, well equipped installation completed in February 1969. As of December 1969, the Interrogation Center was staffed with 78 ARVN personnel and 3 US advisors, with US and ROK interrogation teams present on an "as required" basis. Since the first interrogation conducted in the Center on 15 February 1969, over 200 sources have been interrogated with information disseminated to ARVN and FVMAF units on a timely basis. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross inspected the II Corps Interrogation Center in November 1969 and described it as the best facility of its kind seen in Vietnam.

(c) There are currently 26 ARVN interrogators assigned to the II Corps Interrogation Center. Four of these personnel possess from four to ten years' experience in this field and are established professionals. The other interrogators are either unseasoned or recently trained. The advisors developed a training program which ARVN implemented in May 1969. This program initially places the trainee under the guidance of an experienced interrogator. The instruction and techniques learned from the experts are then put to practical application by interrogating previously interrogated prisoners. Through this technique, confidence is developed and tangible results provide a basis for comparison. After three weeks of such training the trainees are assigned to Mobile Interrogation Teams or "Go Teams." These teams travel to subordinate units to assist in conducting actual combat interrogations. Their skills are tested and valuable experience is gained under field conditions. The expeditious and skilled reporting of the "Go Teams" confirms the merit of this training program.

(d) The organization for POW interrogation within II CTZ is sound, productive, and responsive to the needs of commanders and higher headquarters. Progress during the past year in the operations of the Corps Interrogation Center has demonstrated that it is capable of functioning independently of advisory assistance.

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## c. Intelligence Training.

(1) In December 1968 only 50% of the regimental S2s and 25% of the battalion S2s had received schooling for their assignments. Through advisory efforts, Headquarters, II CTZ has requested additional quotas for the RVNAF Military Intelligence School at Cai Mai with the result that the majority of II Corps G2/S2 personnel from corps level through battalion level are now trained.

(2) The principal weaknesses in ARVN intelligence training surfaced during the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign in May-June 1969. There was little evidence of organization within the G2 Section of the 24th STZ. There was no intelligence plan, no specific statements of intelligence requirements, nor any evidence of centralized intelligence tasking. Battlefield intelligence was not stressed. Consequently, little effort was made to capture prisoners, search the battlefield dead, or police the battlefield for documents and material. As a result of these weaknesses, G2, II Corps directed personnel from the Corps G2 Staff to conduct a four-week refresher course for 24th STZ intelligence personnel, orientation briefings on battlefield intelligence were organized for combat troops, and the collection plans of the 22d and 23d Divisions were reassessed. All intelligence personnel in II CTZ were required to examine the after-action report on the lessons learned at Ben Het - Dak To.

## d. Intelligence Production.

(1) The G2 Section at corps level has the capability of evaluating, analyzing, and collating intelligence information from all sources and producing a finished intelligence document. The intelligence estimates produced by G2, II CTZ are widely respected by Headquarters, IFFV and Headquarters, MACV.

(2) The G2 Sections at division and STZ levels also produce timely intelligence reports. Regimental and battalion S2s, however, do not have the capability to produce finished intelligence. Their small staffs confine their activities to information reporting.

(3) The primary weaknesses in the ARVN process of producing intelligence is the difficulty in obtaining timely, accurate intelligence reports from subordinate units and from the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers. Consequently, it is not always certain that all pertinent information is available to the intelligence analysts at division and corps levels. Improvement has been noted in the reporting procedures of subordinate units since a series of staff visits was initiated in August 1969. The G2, II Corps; G2 Advisor; and representatives from CORDS and the National Police visit a Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center on a bi-weekly basis to examine their operations and to stress the importance of timely intelligence collection, coordination, and reporting.

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## 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. There is no counterintelligence capability within the structure of the G2 Sections of ARVN. Counterintelligence operations of ARVN, VNAF, and VNN in South Vietnam are controlled by the Military Security Directorate (MSD) in Saigon. The Military Security Service (MSS) is the Army counterintelligence organization.

b. The MSS maintains territorial military security detachments at corps and division levels. The authorized MSS strength for II CTZ is 511 personnel but the assigned strength is considerably less.

c. The II CTZ MSS has established a training program for the security education of troops assigned to Headquarters, II Corps. MSS personnel also conduct periodic security inspections and background investigations.

d. The effectiveness of MSS operations in II CTZ is difficult to judge because their product is not made available to advisors. The G2, II Corps has expressed dissatisfaction with the work of the MSS in II CTZ on several occasions. While specific reasons for this dissatisfaction were not mentioned, the impression remained that he has no confidence in their ability or in their operations.

## 5. THE II CORPS ARVN LRRP PROGRAM.

a. One of the major advances in ARVN's target acquisition capability during the past year has been the vast improvement in the employment of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs). In December 1968, divisional and regimental LRRP platoons had been formed, trained, and deployed. However, their effectiveness was extremely limited and ARVN enthusiasm for LRRP operations was tepid. In December 1968, only 13 LRRP operations were undertaken and three sightings recorded. By December 1969, LRRP operations were averaging 80 per month with over 25 sightings/contacts reported each month. This highly significant development resulted from strong, continual advisory emphasis on the valuable intelligence that could be gained with nominal expenditures of men and resources, as displayed by the dramatic success of US LRRPs. These efforts were finally bolstered by ARVN command interest from corps level through all command echelons.

b. Contributing to the success achieved by this program were the following advisory instigated activities:

(1) A special six-week LRRP training course was organized at each Division Training Center.

(2) A LRRP Advisor was appointed at corps, division, and regimental levels.

(3) All LRRP Advisors attended a ten-day orientation course at the MACV Recondo School.

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(4) LRRP orientations were arranged for all key ARVN commanders, staff officers, and advisors at the MACV Recondo School.

(5) A special LRRP platoon of the 2d Ranger Group was trained, equipped, and deployed at the direction of the Commanding General, II CTZ.

(6) Combined US/ARVN LRRP operations were promoted and fostered. These operations not only enhanced the relationship between US and ARVN personnel through mutual trust and cooperation, but instilled confidence and pride in ARVN LRRP personnel.

(7) Increasingly better trained and motivated personnel have been sent to Duc My Ranger Training Center for LRRP certification testing. The 60% failure rate in January 1969 was reduced to 25% by November 1969.

d. The LRRP program in II CTZ has developed a self-sustaining training base that is unmatched in the other three corps in South Vietnam.

6. ARVN RELIANCE ON US INTELLIGENCE ASSETS. There is no doubt that ARVN relies upon the technical intelligence collection resources of the US. If these technical resources were turned over to ARVN, they would be employed and managed skillfully. Though ARVN's acceptance and assimilation of new concepts and techniques is slow, once they accept a program--and command interest is assured--they pursue the program with enthusiasm. Evidence of this was observed in their LRRP and TIGHT JAW programs. By the same token, if the technical resources were withdrawn from ARVN, their intelligence production would be only moderately affected. The one exception to this is the technical Intelligence Report (IR). ARVN places great faith and confidence in these specialized reports. The discontinuance of these reports would sorely impede ARVN intelligence operations and would eliminate or greatly reduce preemptive operational opportunities for ARVN units.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS. This headquarters has forwarded the following recommendations:

a. The apparent phased withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam focuses attention on the increased importance of the advisory role in carrying out the objectives of US policy. This is particularly true in the intelligence area. Intelligence advisors must be trained and experienced in the intelligence field to be effective as an advisor. A system should be established at the Department of the Army level to program experienced intelligence personnel against advisory intelligence billets down to regimental level. Controls should be built into the system to assure that those earmarked for these key billets are actually placed in them.

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
b. The language barrier is a distinct limiting factor in the intelligence advisory effort. Lack of language capability has caused misunderstandings between advisors and their counterparts and in some cases has reduced the advisory relationship to an occasional exchange of written reports. As a corollary to the first recommendation above, a long range plan should be established to program future intelligence advisors to Vietnamese language courses prior to deployment to Vietnam.

c. The internal security of ARVN agencies and installations would be elevated were they provided a counterintelligence capability. The commander would have an organic element immediately responsive to his requirements and would not have to rely on an outside organization for this important service. There may be political aspects involved in the present structure of the Military Security Department, but as seen from II Corps, a definite requirement exists for ARVN commanders to have a counterintelligence unit under their command and control.


d. Reconsideration should be given to the proposal that Senior Advisors to divisions and to the Special Tactical Zone be authorized access to Special Intelligence. In combat situations, key decisions are based on the intelligence available, and Senior Advisors are expected to influence these decisions. Experience has clearly demonstrated that information provided by Special Intelligence on a timely basis can be the decisive factor in determining the outcome of a battle. Without this important product, the Senior Advisor is unable to make a complete judgement and, as a consequence, he is often unable to offer the optimum recommendation to his counterpart. The security considerations for denying access to this information to division/STZ advisors under controlled conditions do not, in my judgement, override the potential value of this information to these advisors.



**VIET- CONG  
MILITARY REGIONS  
AND B3 FRONT  
IN II CTZ**





**MAJOR  
ENEMY  
POSITIONS  
IN  
II CTZ**



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# MAJOR TRUCK AND SAMPAN ROUTES





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### Annex B (Operations)

1. (C) STRATEGY. The strategic objective of II Corps during the period covered by this report was GVN control of the population through operations in support of pacification and the revolutionary development program. By the end of January 1963, as a result of the JGS/MACV directed Combined Campaign Plan, 53 percent of the hamlets and 81 percent of the population had been brought under GVN control within A, B, or C Categories. This achievement, accomplished under the direction of the accelerated pacification program, signaled a change to II Corps force disposition and tactical employment. II Corps regular and territorial units were re-postured to concentrate maximum effort and strength to further increase the impetus of the pacification program which was rapidly gaining momentum. Despite the disruptive effects of two large scale campaigns -- the Chu Pa Campaign in January and February and the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign during May through July -- II Corps efforts to bring the population under control neared fruition by the end of October. Spectacular gains had been made with 90 percent of the hamlets and 95 percent of the population in II Corps in A, B, or C Categories. The increased population control paid rich dividends. Intelligence improved as the citizens, realizing that a protective shield was provided by the pacification effort, identified more closely with the government and commenced reporting enemy activities. Simultaneously, local guerrilla units gradually decreased their attacks and showed definite signs of weakening. Territorial forces commenced replacing regular battalions within pacified areas and thus provided the springboard for the next revolutionary step aimed at total population control and destruction of the enemy's popular support. On 15 September, the II Corps Commander radically changed the thrust of employment of his regular units. He recognized the population control his forces had achieved, the newly developed ability and confidence of the territorial forces to replace regular units, and the signs that the local guerrillas' control of the population had been effectively diluted. General Lu Lan implemented a plan which called for maximum combat operations designed to maintain the initiative and to drive the insurgent away from the peripheries of the newly pacified areas. Special mobile task forces were formed in each of II Corps' three tactical zones. These forces -- normally composed of two battalions of infantry, controlled by a regimental headquarters, and augmented by additional supporting elements -- vigorously launched a series of sharp attacks into enemy base areas that had heretofore been the control and supply centers for enemy operations targeted against the population centers. By mid-November, the II Corps offensive plan had gained encouraging momentum, with the highest number of ARVN battalions conducting offensive operations at one time that had ever occurred since the beginning of the reporting period. II Corps had begun to display a renewed offensive spirit and sense of purpose born of the realization that the Viet Cong's popular base had been greatly reduced as a result of the successful pacification program.

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2. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. At the beginning of the reporting period, mid-December 1968, a lull had settled on the battlefield while both sides prepared for future operations. The disposition and mission of each major subordinate command were as follows: the 22d Division was supporting pacification in its area of operations, with emphasis on populous Binh Dinh Province; the 23d Division, in an economy of force role, was conducting pacification and security operations in defense of major population centers throughout its vast area of operations; and the 24th Special Tactical Zone was providing security in support of pacification in the populated areas of Kontum Province, generally along Highway 14.

### a. The First Chu Pa Campaign.

(1) Toward end-December, intelligence reports of the movement of enemy forces into the northwestern area of II Corps presaged an end to the lull in fighting. The 24th NVA Regiment was suspected of having re-infiltrated into Vietnam and was thought to be operating from a base area in the Chu Pa Mountains, northwest of Pleiku. Colonel Lien, CO, 24th STZ, confirmed this information through a Hoi Chanh. To counter this threat, a combined ARVN/US operation (BINH TAY/MACARTHUR) was planned for January in the Chu Pa area. The mission was to defeat the enemy in the base area and to destroy his supplies. The operation was initiated on 4 January 1969 as ARVN battalions on a reconnaissance in force mission began making daily contact with elements of the 24th NVA Regiment.

(2) In the next phase of the operation, ARVN battalions provided a blocking force while US battalions from the 4th Infantry Division air assaulted into the area and began sweeping in an effort to drive the enemy out of his dug-in positions toward the ARVN forces. The combined ARVN/US operation was successful and preempted the enemy Spring Offensive. The operation ended on 28 February 1969, with the withdrawal of the enemy into Cambodia. ARVN forces captured or destroyed over 300 tons of materiel and supplies and killed over 500 NVA (body count).

### b. The Dak To - Ben Het Campaign.

(1) A phase of the enemy plan for his Summer Offensive called for the interdiction of Highway 14N between Pleiku and Kontum Cities during March and April. However, the 3d ARVN Cavalry Squadron, moving with lightning speed, thwarted two attempted ambushes along the highway and killed 63 NVA (body count). With II Corps forces by mid-April spread thinly throughout the area of operations, the enemy revealed the objective of his offensive with heavy attacks by fire in the Dak To area. In addition, intelligence reports suggested the preparation of a ground attack against the Ben Het CIDG Camp and attacks on populated areas in Kontum Province.

(2) The enemy Summer Offensive began on 5 May when elements of the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments, supported by the 40th Artillery Regiment, commenced intensive bombardments of Dak To and Ben Het. As planned, ARVN

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elements conducted reconnaissances in force to pinpoint enemy forces so that offensive operations could be initiated. Once this had been accomplished, ARVN elements, utilizing US tactical and strategic air support, by early June drove the enemy from his entrenched positions overlooking Dak To. The enemy then shifted his emphasis toward Ben Het where he successfully isolated the camp, denied air resupply, and threatened its capture. Colonel Lien, on receipt of reinforcements, attacked along Highway 512 and -- thanks to massive air and artillery support -- was able to successfully lift the siege of the camp. The enemy withdrew leaving over 1900 dead (body count). The Dak To - Ben Het Campaign clearly demonstrated ARVN's ability to respond aggressively to a division-sized NVA main force threat. It must be emphasized, however, that the decisive factor in this ARVN victory was the provision of massive US combat support assets, with emphasis on B52 strikes.

(3) After the Battle of Ben Het, the enemy terminated his unsuccessful Summer Offensive. By mid-July, all NVA forces which had participated in the offensive had withdrawn to sanctuaries in the Tri-Border area to refit. Previous experience, however, indicated that the enemy is a creature of habit; therefore, our attention became focused on Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces since the enemy had deployed to these areas following his Summer Offensive last year. By mid-August, intelligence reports indicated that major B-3 Front enemy forces were moving south from the Tri-Border area. At the end of August, intelligence had confirmed the presence of these B-3 Front units in Cambodia opposite the II Corps-III Corps Border. With the arrival of support elements by late August, the NVA units began their preparations for attacks against objectives in Quang Duc Province. CG, IFFV promptly reinforced the Bu Prang CIDG Camp forces with two MSF battalions. CO, 23d Division dispatched a battalion of the 45th Regiment to the Duc Lap area and made plans to counter the expected enemy offensive.

### c. The Bu Prang - Duc Lap Campaign.

(1) In an effort to thwart the enemy buildup, fire support bases manned by ARVN and IFFV artillery units were established in Quang Duc Province. Once the bases were completed, US air cavalry assets were shifted to support the 23d Division in their efforts to find the enemy. When the enemy infantry and sapper battalions were located, Colonel Canh, CO, 23d Division, began concentrating his maneuver elements, reinforced by a task force of two battalions from the 47th Regiment, in the Duc Lap and Nhon Co areas. To permit the build-up of the 23d Division in Quang Duc, two battalions of the 4th US Infantry Division assumed the major role in the defense of Ban Me Thuot by replacing two 23d Division battalions.

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(2) The intensive artillery, mortar, and rocket preparation fired on 20 October against Fire Support Bases Anne, Kate, and Helen in the vicinity of the CIDG Camp at Du Prang signaled the start of the long-awaited battle. According to plan, these fire support bases were closed out and the combat elements displaced to Camp Du Prang. Through intelligence sources it was determined that the 66th NVA Regiment was preparing an assault against the Du Prang Camp and that the 23th FVA Regiment was preparing for attacks in the Duc Lap area -- both attacks supported by elements of the 40th FVA Artillery Regiment and main and local force artillery, sapper, and infantry units. Colonel Canh reacted with the prompt reinforcement of the Du Prang Camp with two ARVN battalions. Enemy pressure against the Du Prang and Duc Lap areas gradually increased throughout November, characterized by hugging tactics in an attempt to reduce the effects of massive allied air and artillery strikes. The ARVN commanders foiled this tactic with reasonable success by directing offensive actions during the day and withdrawing to strong defensive positions at night. In addition, they elected to avoid decisive engagements in terrain favorable to the enemy. As of 1 December 1969, the operation has resulted in the killing of over 1350 NVA (body count), the capture of seven prisoners, and the return of one Hoi Chanh. As in the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign, ARVN maneuver elements have been lavishly supported by US TAC AIR, helicopter, and artillery assets. Thus far, the combat effectiveness of the ARVN units has been good, although the offensive spirit of commanders and troops has been, with rare exception, tepid in nature.

## 3. (C) II CORPS UNITS.

a. 22d Division. From December 1968 until September 1969, the 22d Division was predominantly committed to pacification operations in its area of operations (AO), consisting of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon Provinces. In April 1969, the 40th and 41st Regiments began combined pacification operations in Binh Dinh Province with elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade. A two battalion task force from the 47th Regiment and the 14th AAV Squadron (less one troop) reinforced the 24th STZ during the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign in June 1969. The 14th AAV Squadron (-) remained in Kontum Province after the termination of the campaign to conduct road security operations on Highways 14 and 512 from Kontum to Ben Het. Task Force 220, controlled by the 47th Regiment headquarters, and augmented by other supporting forces as required, was designated in mid-September as a mobile strike force in line with LTG Lu Lan's plan to conduct offensive operations on the periphery of the pacified areas. In early November, Task Force 220, minus the AAV troop, was deployed to Quang Duc Province to reinforce the 23d Division during the Duc Lap - Du Prang Campaign. The division received a new commander in July, BG Trien, who has displayed encouraging competence and energy.

(1) 40th and 41st Regiments. The 40th and 41st Regiments conducted pacification operations in the Bong Son Plains and Phu Ly Valley, respective



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ly. In October, tactical emphasis was shifted from static pacification operations to small scale, short duration combat operations. This trend continued into late November and culminated in battalion-sized search and clear operations conducted in northern Binh Dinh Province, aimed at enemy base areas. The CO, 40th Regiment is good. The CO, 41st Regiment, an excellent commander, was recently permanently disabled in a terrorist attack. His deputy is only fair, and no replacement is in sight. The regiment fought well initially at Bu Prang and accounted for more than its share of enemy KIA. A mistaken bombing by VNAF caused heavy casualties, however, and the task force was replaced by a task force from the 53d Regiment. The regimental commander, Colonel Binh, has a good combat record but has "stacked arms" in anticipation of his early assignment to the National Defense College.

(2) 47th Regiment. The 47th Regiment conducted pacification operations in the Tuy Hoa area with a minimum of two battalions and constituted the reaction force for the 22d Division and II Corps. The regiment (-) was employed in the Chu Pa Campaign in Pleiku Province in January-February 1969 and in the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign in western Kontum Province in June-July 1969. Formation of Task Force 220 in mid-September provided the regiment with a highly mobile force that was employed throughout the 22d DTA on offensive operations. In early November this force, less the ACAV troop, deployed to Bu Prang where it was attached to the 23d Division for operations against the large scale enemy attack launched in western Quang Duc Province against the Bu Prang CIDG Camp and Duc Lap District.

b. 23d Division. From December 1968 until September 1969, the 23d Division under Colonel Canh, a competent commander, was employed in an economy of force role while conducting pacification and security operations in defense of major population centers throughout the vast division area of responsibility, which is larger than either I, III, or IV Corps. In August, the division commenced to position its forces to counter a large enemy build-up in the vicinity of the Bu Prang and Duc Lap CIDG Camps in western Quang Duc. In late October, the enemy launched multiple ground and stand-off attacks against both camps and their prepositioned fire support bases. The momentum of the enemy attack continued into November with a number of sharp, fiercely fought battalion size engagements. The division, reinforced by TF 220 as indicated above, deployed multi-battalion-sized forces in the Phou Co/Gia Nghia, Duc Lap, and Bu Prang areas initially in a defensive role and, after heavy preparation by TAC AIR, B52 strikes, and artillery, launched a series of attacks aimed at the destruction of the enemy forces. The battle continues at the time of this report. As for the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign during May-July, the Bu Prang - Duc Lap Campaign is characterized by the provision of strong US combat support assets.

(1) 44th Regiment. One to four battalions conducted pacification operations designed to protect the densely populated areas along Highway 1 in Binh Thuan and Ninh Thuan Provinces. From mid-September to December, battalion-sized offensive operations were conducted in Binh Thuan, Ninh

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Thuan, and Tuyen Duc Provinces targeted against enemy forces that threatened the population centers in these three provinces. In late October, one battalion deployed to Lam Dong Province relieving a battalion of the 53d Regiment for deployment in the Quang Duc Campaign. This regiment is handicapped by a weak commander; hence, weak results. The Corps Commander alleges that he has been trying to replace him for over five months, but JCS has no replacement and he states he has none from his own assets.

(2) 45th Regiment. From January to late August, one battalion conducted pacification, security, and search and clear operations in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot. In August, one battalion initiated search and clear operations in the vicinity of Duc Lap to spoil the enemy buildup in that area. By mid-October, the entire regiment was decisively engaged in the Duc Lap area after being relieved of its pacification mission by elements of the 4th Division and other units of the 23d Division. The 45th Regiment is the best overall regiment in II Corps.

(3) 53d Regiment. The four infantry battalions of this relatively new unit (one battalion deployed in December 1968 and one in April 1969) conducted pacification and security operations in assigned areas of operation in Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong, and Darlac Provinces. In mid-June, a two battalion task force deployed to Kontum Province and participated with marginal results in the pursuit phase of the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign. At the close of this operation, the regiment once again reverted to pacification operations in its assigned areas of operation. In mid-September, battalion-size offensive operations were launched into enemy base areas. A two battalion task force was later deployed to the Gia Nghia area as part of the 23d Division buildup in Quang Duc Province. This task force relieved Task Force 220 at Bu Prang in mid-November and commenced offensive operations designed to provide the counterstroke aimed at the destruction of the surrounding enemy forces. This battle is the first blood letting of consequence this regiment has known. Fortunately, the regiment's former weak, timid commander has been replaced by an officer who might whip the regiment into shape.

c. 24th Special Tactical Zone. The 24th STZ, with its assigned 42d Regiment, launched four major combat operations from January through November 1969: the Chu Pa Campaign, January - February; the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign, May - July; a second Chu Pa Campaign in October - November; and a campaign in the Tourmourong in late November. Pacification, security, and reconnaissance in force operations were conducted concurrently with these operations. All operations were supported by elements of the 2d Ranger Group. The Dak To - Ben Het Campaign was further reinforced with elements of the 3d and 14th AAV Squadrons and, as discussed above, two multi-battalion task forces from the 22d and 23d Divisions. The regiment has fought well, despite a commander who ran out of steam during the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign. A new, vigorous, competent commander plus refresher training, as indicated below in the

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report of training, should guard this regiment's reputation as the best fighting regiment aside from the Rangers, in II CTZ; all 24th STZ operations are under the command of Colonel Lien, an aggressive, hard-hitting commander when ready to attack, yet he is handicapped by an undermanned and under-talented staff.

### d. II Corps Troops.

(1) 2d Ranger Group. As II Corps reaction force, Ranger battalions were committed in the February Chu Pa Operation and the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign under 2d Ranger Group control. In November a battalion was placed OPCON to the 23d Division and moved to Nhon Co to conduct offensive operations. Throughout this report period, Ranger elements simultaneously conducted numerous search and clear operations in the vicinity of Pleiku. The Rangers are well led and have the best combat record of any regimental size unit in II Corps.

(2) 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron. The 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron conducted security and combat operations on Highways 14 and 512, between Pleiku and Ben Het and constituted the II Corps reaction force. During the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign the squadron, under OPCON to 24th STZ, played a significant role in reopening Highway 512 and relieving the beleaguered Ben Het CIDG Camp. As previously indicated, the 3d ACAV Squadron always pulls out a decisive, heavily one-sided victory whenever they "wrestle" with the enemy.

(3) Artillery. See Annex D.

### 4. (C) EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONS.

a. Until September, the strategic mission of II Corps was to gain control of the population through pacification and revolutionary development programs. This could be accomplished only by methodically rooting out the enemy, establishing population control measures, conducting security operations, and gaining the confidence of the people. As a consequence, units were placed in static positions, generally for long periods of time, which tended to degrade the spirit of the offensive and to weaken unit effectiveness. As surroundings became more familiar and comfortable, the soldiers became more lethargic and the pace of offensive operations was reduced to an unacceptable rate. Although steady, yet unspectacular, progress was made in the pacification effort, a proper balance between offensive combat operations and pacification operations was felt necessary to maintain the spirit of the attack, foster unit proficiency, and retain the tactical initiative. The change in the II Corps mission in September to the destruction of the enemy in base areas on the periphery of pacified areas allowed commanders to maneuver their forces. This resulted in improved responsiveness, discipline, teamwork, and unit aggressiveness.

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b. The standard for measurement of ARVN combat operations, however, is the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign -- the largest battle fought exclusively by ARVN maneuver forces since 1965. Many lessons learned from this battle illustrate the weaknesses and strengths of the ARVN commander, his staff, and soldiers. A salient conclusion drawn from the campaign after-action analysis, which confirmed previous findings, was that the ARVN commander is still too conventional. He was taught at an early stage in the war to attack with "two up and one back", to move in large formations, and to conduct airmobile assaults only on well reconnoitered, well prepared landing zones. Another conclusion was that the average ARVN commander is inflexible. Once his plan has been devised, approved, and disseminated, it is normally "locked in concrete" irrespective of changes in the enemy situation. This is particularly true at regimental level and lower. The key deficiency uncovered in the analysis was the critical shortage of high quality, tactically proficient leaders at the maneuver unit level. Unfortunately, too many of the professionally competent, aggressive ARVN officers are assigned to division or corps staffs -- leaving a residue of marginal, ineffective, or politically unconnected officers in the regiments, battalions, and companies where life is harsh and demanding. The low quality of junior leaders has significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of maneuver units. Maladroit leadership, the most critical problem which faces ARVN today, has resulted in the inability of most ARVN commanders to motivate soldiers, make them fire their weapons, and get tough under adverse conditions. Strong advisory effort at all levels has been and continues to be devoted to correcting this critical weakness. The average ARVN soldier is willing, brave, and capable of being molded into a first-rate soldier -- if well led. But the soldier's performance, as in most armies, is directly proportional to the demands and example of his leaders.

c. ARVN staffs below division are also weak. The typical regimental or battalion staff officer has limited knowledge of the procedures and techniques required for the employment and control of combat support assets or the coordination of intelligence gathering means. The average ARVN officer displays little sense of urgency, and is content, if permitted, to perform in the manner of "business as usual". For example, during the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign, the 24th STZ Commander and his staff returned to their Kontum Command Post each night instead of remaining in the battlefield area to direct operations. This obviously resulted in a deterioration of command and control, as decisions -- sometimes critical -- could not be made on a timely basis. The Corps staff, on the other hand, is a well managed, smoothly functioning entity manned in the main by excellent officers and NCOs.

d. The lessons learned from the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign were discussed freely and openly by members of the Corps staff and their US counterparts, and remedial action was taken in most instances to correct deficiencies. Accelerated training programs, POI changes at training centers and service schools, and maximum emphasis on leadership training are but a few of the steps taken to date. The Dak To - Ben Het After-Action Report

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constitutes a valuable body of data which serves as the principal vehicle in the II Corps advisory effort for improving the effectiveness of ARVN. II Corps is moving in the right direction -- but time is required to allow II Corps units to develop and mature into a fully viable military force. The offensive campaign initiated by LTC Lu Lan in September should prove a major step toward the goal of achieving a high state of combat readiness. During the current Bu Prang - Duc Lap Campaign, as well as during the earlier Dak To - Ben Het Campaign, CG, IFFORCEV provided optimum US combat support assets and assistance to the engaged ARVN units. This was often accomplished at the expense of taking vitally needed assets from US units.

e. In light of the Vietnamization concept, we must provide ARVN under normal conditions an ever increasing share of US combat support assets. A balanced allocation of combat support means (helicopters, gunships, artillery, TAC AIR, B52 strikes, etc.) will greatly enhance the morale of the Vietnamese line troops and will significantly sharpen their combat efficiency. For example, the US soldier knows that if contact with the enemy is made, TAC AIR, gunships, and artillery will promptly and abundantly become available. ARVN units must increasingly be provided with similar support and must become confident that once a contact is made -- be it on a scale from a battalion attack to a LRRP patrol -- immediate and effective combat support assets will appear. Hopefully, the VNAF TAC AIR and helicopter units will play an increasingly effective role in support of ARVN troops.

5. (C) COMBINED OPERATIONS. The Pairoff Concept, instituted in 1962 whereby an ARVN unit was closely and continually affiliated with a counterpart US unit for operations, was terminated in 1969. This successful program was instrumental in lengthening ARVN unit operations and training ARVN staffs in the employment of US combat support assets. Three major combined combat operations were conducted during the year: the previously discussed January and October Chu Pa Mountain Campaigns conducted by the 4th Division and the 24th STZ and an operation conducted in September astride the eastern I Corps - II Corps boundary involving Task Force 220, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and I Corps US and ARVN maneuver elements. Additionally, Task Force SOUTH, a US brigade-sized unit composed of one airmobile infantry battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, and one armored cavalry squadron executed several small scale combined operations with elements of the 44th and 53d Regiments in Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces, respectively.

6. (C) EMPLOYMENT OF US ARMY AVIATION ASSETS. The most pressing task facing II Corps today in the light of the drawdown of US troops and the concomitant Vietnamization policy is to improve ARVN's ability to conduct airmobile operations -- from a battalion assault to an Eagle Flight or Jitterbug operation. ARVN commanders, staffs, and troops must think airmobility and develop the mental and physical ability to maneuver troops rapidly and extensively throughout the battlefield. Accordingly, maximum



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II Corps advisory emphasis has been directed toward improving ARVN's air-mobile capability. Liaison teams from supporting US Army helicopter units have provided instruction to key ARVN commanders and their staffs with highly encouraging results. A detailed analysis of the supporting 17th Combat Aviation Group's IBM printout on aircraft utilization for all forces in II Corps is prepared monthly by the II Corps Advisory Group and disseminated to division and zone senior advisors for appropriate action. In October, a "MINI CAV" pilot test program was conducted by elements of the 2d Ranger Group, the results of which are found in paragraph 2g, Annex C. Although progress has been made, further training followed by increased helicopter assets for combat operations is required, even if these assets are provided at the expense of reducing operations of FWMAF.

## 7. (C) ARMOR OPERATIONS.

a. General. The three armored cavalry squadrons assigned to II Corps were seldom deployed in offensive operations; they were normally employed in a static or road security role. Little advantage was taken of the excellent terrain in the Highlands for the conduct of armor-infantry operations. In order to redress this apparent underdeployment of II Corps mechanized units, this headquarters requested the Senior Advisor, ARVN Armor Command, to conduct an inspection of II Corps ARVN units in October and early November with the mission of analyzing their employment and effectiveness. His final report confirmed the uneconomical employment of armor units within II Corps. In late November, a conference at II Corps, attended by representatives of the Armor Advisory Group, II Corps advisory personnel, and the senior advisors of each Corps ACAV squadron addressed this deficiency. The conference outlined problem areas and ways and means to improve armor employment within the Corps. Formal recommendations will be forwarded to the II Corps Commander which, if accepted, will convert our virtually dormant ACAV squadrons to responsive, hard-hitting strike forces.

b. The 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron. The 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron (-) has been operating in the 24th Special Tactical Zone since June when it was dispatched from the 22d Division to Kontum Province during the Dak To - Ben Het Campaign. Because of the suitability of armor for operations in the Highlands and because of the gradual phase-out from the Highlands of 4th Infantry Division mechanized assets, the squadron, less one troop, has been retained under operational control of the 24th STZ. CG, II Corps, with strong advisory support, has recommended that the entire 14th ACAV Squadron be permanently assigned to the 24th STZ. This move would reunite all elements of the squadron, increase unit morale, reduce acute maintenance and logistics problems, simplify command and control, and release the 2d Troop, 3d ACAV Squadron, presently OPCON to the 14th Cavalry in Kontum Province, to its parent unit in Pleiku Province where it is critically needed. More significantly, if the two squadrons are reconstituted, it is envisioned that only one squadron would be required for the road security mission between Pleiku and Kontum -- thus freeing an entire squadron for offensive operations.

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### 8. (C) CHEMICAL OPERATIONS.

a. Airborne Personnel Detector Operations. In August an Airborne Personnel Detector Program (APD) was vigorously launched. The first step of this program was the publication of an LOI which provided guidelines for APD employment and support to ARVN commanders and advisors. This LOI outlined equipment operation, staff planning, coordination procedures, employment techniques and important lessons learned as developed by US units. The LOI was followed by an extensive training program by the Corps Chemical Advisor aimed at "selling APD operations" to senior advisor personnel. Advisory personnel fully supported this program and soon each division/zone had school-trained operators who received formal training at Long Binh. The 23d Division Advisory Group was initially allocated one personnel detector and in early August, because of the enemy buildup in Quang Duc Province, an additional detector was provided to expand the division's search capability. The 22d Division and the 24th STZ do not have organic APD equipment and must rely on the 4th Division and 173d Airborne Brigade, respectively, to provide APD support. This temporary support, which is on a loan basis, has been highly effective. Both divisions and the special tactical zone have initiated programs to train ARVN personnel as APD operators. As an example, the 22d Division now has eight fully trained ARVN operators. This program was well received by ARVN and has improved II Corps ability to detect the enemy. The effectiveness of the APD program, however, is limited due to the shortage of APD assets. The II Corps staff is now processing a request to JCS recommending authorization of three APDs for each division and two APDs for the 24th STZ. If approved, II Corps units will have an organic and permanent capability for detecting enemy forces which, if properly exploited, should dramatically increase their enemy "kills".

b. Other Chemical Operations. In the past year, the Tralldust Herbicide Program in II CTZ was expanded considerably. As of 30 November, a total of 840 defoliation and crop destruction sorties have been flown as compared with 369 during CY 1968. In addition, the II Corps Chemical Advisor and his counterpart conducted many heliborne crop destruction and perimeter defoliation operations employing the AGAVENCO helicopter mounted spray device. An example of the extensive employment of the AGAVENCO is that in October alone, it was used to spray more than 80 percent of the enemy crops detected in Quang Duc Province. To resolve the long standing, recurring problem of controlling vegetation around outposts and installations, an LOI was published in September which has resulted in measurable improvements. Lastly, air delivered CS has been used extensively to support ground operations. During the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign and the more recent Quang Duc Operations, for example, II Corps employed helicopter and tactical air delivered CS munitions on known and probable enemy lines of communication with excellent results.

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## ANNEX C (Organization and Training)

### 1. (C) ORGANIZATION.

a. Force Structure Increase Program. One of the highest RVNAF priority projects conducted during the past year was the activation, training, and equipping of new units. To stay abreast of this critical project and review progress, weekly committee meetings were initiated in April under the chairmanship of the Corps G4. These meetings proved invaluable in the early identification of problem areas and in the rapid development of solutions. Problem areas that could not be resolved at Corps level were expeditiously forwarded to JCS/MACV for action. The following II Corps units have been deployed since December 1968 or will be deployed within six months:

3d Bn, 53d Regt	22 Dec 68
14th ACAV Sqdn	22 Feb 69
233d Field Arty Bn	3 Mar 69
4th Bn, 53d Regt	26 Apr 69
22d Direct Support Bn	1 May 69
23d Direct Support Bn	1 May 69
22d Medical Bn	1 Jul 69
23d Medical Bn	1 Jul 69
45th Field Arty Bn	15 Jul 69
223d Field Arty Bn	27 Dec 69
69th Field Arty Bn	15 May 70

b. Activation of the 215th VNAF Helicopter Squadron. The 215th VNAF Helicopter Squadron, activated on 1 September in Nha Trang, supports ARVN, LLDB, and Territorial Forces throughout II Corps. Requests for helicopter support submitted by these units through II Corps to II DASC are closely monitored by the G3 Air Advisor and the 17th US Combat Aviation Group Liaison Officer to insure proper aircraft utilization. Three significant, unresolved problems, however, limit the effectiveness of the squadron. First, the squadron's eight authorized gunships are not scheduled for delivery



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until 1 March 1970, thus requiring the employment of mixed US and VNAF assets for ARVN airmobile and resupply operations. Second, for the twenty aircraft currently on hand, only eight to thirteen crews are available on any given day. Accordingly, continued emphasis is being placed on training more pilots to achieve the authorized strength level. Third, with the exception of two medevac helicopters stationed in Pleiku, the stationing of the remainder of the squadron in Nha Trang severely limits II Corps control and the ability of the squadron to support units in the Highlands where the bulk of II Corps ARVN units are located. Since the squadron now depends on the VNAF maintenance facility at Nha Trang, every effort is being made to provide an effective squadron-level maintenance capability so that the squadron may relocate soonest to Pleiku.

c. Advisor Organization under the CAT Concept. From August through November 1968, a new advisory organizational concept, designated the Combat Assistance Team (CAT), was formed and tested by the Advisory Group of the 22d ARVN Division for the purpose of determining the feasibility of replacing authorized advisory teams within the division with smaller Combat Assistance Teams. The test demonstrated that the proposed concept improved ARVN's leadership and initiative and increased ARVN's capability of making independent use of US combat support assets. Accordingly, COMUSMACV granted each Corps Senior Advisor the authority to organize advisory elements under the CAT concept. Subsequent evaluation of the CAT concept -- combined with the experience of the long, bitterly-fought Dak To - Ben Het Campaign -- indicated, however, that ARVN's improvement was not as significant as anticipated, that substantial advisory assistance was still needed, and that organizational changes at all advisory levels were required. To provide depth and flexibility and to increase communications capability, it was recommended that the battalion CATs be increased from one officer and one NCO to two officers and two NCOs. Reappraisal of the regimental CATs revealed the need for a larger advisory staff due to increases in multi-battalion operations and the corps-wide weakness of ARVN regimental staffs. Differences in missions, geography, areas of responsibility, and available combat support precluded the standardization of the advisory effort at division and special zone; therefore, the division and zone CATs were tailored to meet their respective needs (see Inclosures 1, 2, and 3.) The corps CAT was reorganized (see Inclosure 4) to eliminate nonessential spaces and improve operational capabilities by reducing Highland Scout Advisors, increasing advisors to the Ranger Group, and forming Mobile Advisory Teams for artillery and engineer battalions (see Inclosure 5.) The proposed changes were approved by CG, IFFV, and have been forwarded to COMUSMACV.

### 2. (C) TRAINING.

a. Leadership Training. The Dak To - Ben Het Campaign After-Action Report highlighted the critical requirement for better quality junior leaders in ARVN units. Accordingly, division commanders were directed to

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establish and emphasize Leadership Training Courses. In the third quarter, 150 officers graduated from the CO/TO Refresher Course at the 22d Division Training Center as compared with 36 during the previous quarter. In July, the 23d Division established three Junior Leadership Courses: a Platoon Leader Course, a Squad Leader Course, and a Heavy Weapons Leader Course. Through October, 334 officers and NCOs have graduated from these courses.

b. Individual Training. Individual training received strong emphasis at both the 22d and 23d Division Training Centers throughout 1969. This training is closely monitored by advisors and by corps and division inspectors. As a result, the quality of instruction and standards of proficiency established at both division training centers have improved immeasurably since the beginning of the year. To further assist in monitoring individual training, monthly division training center status reports are submitted through I Field Force Vietnam to MACV. The Dak To - Ben Het After-action Report pointed out weaknesses in the planning and control of combat support and intelligence gathering assets. As basic actions to redress the deficiencies, II Corps Advisory Group recommended to the MACV Training Directorate that the POIs of the ARVN Command and General Staff College and officer courses at the branch schools be revised to reflect increased emphasis in the aforementioned subjects and, further, that Mobile Training Teams be sent to the divisions and special zone to provide training in these subjects for commanders and their staffs. The study of the POIs at the courses indicated is in force, but the request for the Mobile Training Teams was not approved by MACV. Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, however, designated a staff group to deploy with ARVN division/STZ tactical command posts during major combat operations for the purpose of providing technical assistance and coordinating the employment of US combat support and combat service support assets. This group was deployed during the Quang Duc Campaign in November 1969.

c. Specialist Training. Specialist training became a matter of strong advisory emphasis during the second quarter of 1969 as a result of II Corps failure in filling only 30 percent of its allocated quotas during the first quarter. A remedial system was instituted which required all corps units to report any anticipated shortfalls one week prior to the beginning of each Specialist Training Course. Unfilled quotas were then transferred to other units which had requirements for this training. By July, II Corps had oversubscribed its quotas and has continued to do so thereafter. Commanders, after observing the results of Specialist Training, have strongly encouraged maximum participation.

d. Unit Training. Despite heavy commitment to pacification and combat operations, a vigorous Unit Refresher Training Program was administered by II Corps during 1969. The 4th and 1st Bns, 42d Regt completed four weeks of Battalion Refresher Training in September and October, respectively, at the Lam Son National Training Center. The 11th and 23d Ranger Bns completed six weeks of Battalion Refresher Training at the

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Duc My Ranger Training Center in July and November, respectively. The 1st Bn, 45th Regt completed four weeks of Battalion Refresher Training at the 23d Division Training Center in October. The 2nd Bn, 45th Regt began Refresher Training on 27 October; however, operational requirements necessitated taking the battalion out of training to counter the enemy threat in Quang Duc Province. Refresher Training for this battalion will be rescheduled at a later date. The 3d Bn, 45th Regt, is scheduled for similar training on 1 December, and the regiment's 4th Bn on 12 January 1970. All four battalions of the 44th Regt participated in "New Horizon" training at Song Mao from August through November (see Annex G.) The 42d Regt began the "New Horizon" program in October. The 22d Division was unable to conduct Battalion Training because of involvement in the critical pacification program in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces. However, during the year, eighteen rifle companies completed Company Refresher Training at the Division Training Center.

e. In-Place Training. ARVN commanders have shown little interest or initiative in instituting in-place unit training programs during stand-down periods. Advisors have emphasized the importance of using time between operations to conduct training in those areas where the units have shown obvious weaknesses. Advisors' recommendations were generally accepted with apparent enthusiasm, but were not acted upon. This problem was repeatedly brought to the attention of CG, II Corps, but without results. It was therefore recommended that the MACV Training Directorate study the feasibility of instituting formal unit training programs for all ARVN units during stand-down periods and encourage JGS to place maximum command emphasis on this vital requirement.

f. ARVN Tank Crew Training. In order to upgrade the combat effectiveness of ARVN Tank Crews, M48 Tank Training was initiated in mid-October. The 1st Bn, 69th Armor, 4th Infantry Division presents a seven day course which consists of vehicle familiarization (M48A3), maintenance, driving, turret familiarization, and crew drill. The 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron, which is currently training one of their 19 crews each week, is expected to complete training in February 1970. Thereafter, the 14th and 8th Cavalry Squadrons will participate in the program.

g. MINICAV Pilot Test Program. In October, the 2d Ranger Group underwent a "MINICAV" Pilot Test to determine the feasibility of allocating air cavalry assets to ARVN units for combat operations on a recurring basis. Three days of classes involving the employment of air cavalry, tactical air, and artillery were conducted by II Corps Advisors and their counterparts prior to a six day field operation. Although enemy casualties during the test were not high, it is significant that four friendly-initiated contacts had occurred. As a result of the success of the test, Hqs, I Field Force Vietnam approved the recommendation that identical training and testing be offered to each ARVN regiment in II Corps. Completion of such training will result in the ability of each ARVN infantry maneuver element in II Corps to employ effectively air cavalry assets and to conduct fast reaction airmobile operations ("Eagle Flights".)

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h. "Cross Fertilization of Ideas" Program. The "Cross Fertilization of Ideas" Program, initiated at the beginning of 1969, involved exchange visits by ARVN commanders and their advisors within II Corps. These visits have resulted in an exchange of ideas and recent innovations, both administrative and tactical, which have greatly assisted commanders and advisors in identifying fresh approaches and solutions to common problems. In September, a similar exchange program was initiated by the II Corps Advisory Group whereby commanders, principal staff officers, and their counterparts from battalion through corps level began visits to the 1st ARVN Division in I Corps, one of the finest infantry units in Vietnam.

i. Dak To - Ben Het After-Action Report. The Dak To - Ben Het battles fought in Kontum Province from the end of May through early July 1969 constituted the largest and most hotly contested campaign fought exclusively by ARVN maneuver elements since the introduction of US ground forces in 1965. This campaign resulted in a resounding ARVN victory (over 1910 enemy KIA vs. 186 ARVN KIA) with the enemy being forced to withdraw to Cambodia. Much of the credit for this victory, however, must be attributed to the massive use of US combat support assets, to include B-52 strikes. The Dak To - Ben Het Campaign has been thoroughly documented by Hqs, I Field Force Vietnam; Hqs, MACV; and this headquarters in order to surface mistakes and lessons learned and to recommend corrective action. The foregoing publications were widely disseminated to commanders and advisors throughout Vietnam as well as to appropriate headquarters in the United States. (See "Lessons Learned, the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign," Hqs, MACV, dated 24 August 1969 and "Problem Areas Resulting From Operation Dan Quyen, Dak To - Ben Het Area, May - July 1969," Hqs, US Army Advisory Group, II Corps Tactical Zone, 31 August 1969.) The principal recommendations of this headquarters for corrective actions to redress ARVN deficiencies are covered in this debriefing report.

j. Advisor Training. In October 1969, an advisor training program was initiated in coordination with the 4th Infantry Division as part of the in-processing for all field grade, company grade, and non-commissioned officers of the combat arms who have not had recent combat experience in Vietnam. These officers and NCOs attend the 4th Division's 30 hour in-country training course which has proven of inestimable value in orienting and conditioning our personnel prior to assuming their advisory duties. Officers in grade of Lieutenant Colonel additionally undergo a five day training period with a brigade of the 4th Division where emphasis is placed on instruction in airmobile operations at the brigade and battalion level.

k. Unit Advisors Seminar. The first of a series of unit advisors' seminars was scheduled to be held in November at II Corps Headquarters for battalion and regimental personnel who work at the "grass roots" level of the advisory effort. The first seminar was postponed until early December because increased enemy activity in Quang Duc Province precluded participation by advisors of the 23d Division. The primary objective of the

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seminar will be to identify operations, training, and leadership problems at battalion and company level and to develop solutions. We anticipate that these seminars will materially assist the advisory effort in II Corps and should impact favorably on ARVN's combat effectiveness.

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## 22D DTA

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gk</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Sr Div Adv Det Cmdr	G1542	06	IN	1	0
Team Comdr	G1542	06	IN	0	1
Dep Sr Adv	G1542	05	IN	1	0
Dep Comdr	G1542	05	IN	0	1
Admin Off	02120	03	AG	1	0
Sig Adv	G0210	03	SC	0	1
Div Sr Enl Adv	11G5H	E9	NC	1	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	0	1
	JTD	3 OFF	1 EM TOTAL	4	
	CAT	3 OFF	2 EM TOTAL		5

## G-3 SEC

G3 Adv	G2162	05	IN	1	0
Opns Adv	G2162	05	IN	0	1
Asst G3 Adv	G2162	03	IN	1	0
Opns Off	02162	04	AR	0	1
Tng Ctr Adv	G1542	03	IN	0	1
Opns Off	02162	03	AT	2	0
Asst Opns Off	02162	03	IN	0	3
Opns Sgt	11F50	E8	NC	0	1
Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	3 (E6)	3
Tng Ctr NCO Adv	11F4H	E7	NC	0	0

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## G-3 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
Opns Clerk	71B30	E5	NC	0	2
JTD	4 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	8	
CAT	6 OFF	6 EM	TOTAL		12

## G-4 SEC

Log Adv	04010	04	QM	0	1
Maint Adv	621A8	W0		0	1
Admin/Log NCO	71L40	E7	NC	0	1
AG Adv	G2110	04	AG	0	1
JTD	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	0	
CAT	3 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		4

## INFO ADV

Infor Adv	G5505	03	AT	0	1
JTD	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	0	
CAT	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		1

## DIV HQ DET

Admin Spec	71L20	E5	NC	1	0
JTD	0 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## DET HQ BRANCH

Det Comdr	02900	03	AR	1	1
Det Sgt	71L50	E8	NC	1 (E7)	1
Supply Sgt	76Y40	E7	NC	1 (E6)	1
Mess Stwd	94B40	E7		1 (E6)	1

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DET HQ BRANCH (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Asst Mess Stwd	94B20	E5	NC	1	1
Comm Sgt	31Z40	E7	NC	0	1
Unit Supply Spec	76Y20	E5	NC	1 (E4)	1
Clk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	0	1
Clk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	2	1
Admin Sgt	71L40	E6	NC	0	1
Med Supv	91B40	E6	NC	0	1
Rad Tel Opr	05B20	E4	NC	0	3
Sec Coord	11B40	E6	NC	0	1
Sec Guard	11B40	E5	NC	0	2
Sec Guard	11B20	E4	NC	0	4
Mail Clk	70A10	E3	NC	0	1
JTD	1 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL	8	
CAT	1 OFF	20 EM	TOTAL		21

## MED/ADV TREATMENT BRANCH

Med Adv	G3506	O3	MS	1	1
Med Adv NCO	91B4H	E7	NC	1	0
Jr Med Adv	91B4H	E6	NC	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		1

## ARTY BN ADV

Bn Adv	G1193	O4	AT	2	1
Asst Bn Adv	G1193	O3	FA	0	1
Firing Btry Adv	13B4H	E7	NC	3	2

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## ARTY BN ADV (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
JTD	2 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	5	
CAT	2 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL		4

## ARTY COORD SEC

Arty Coord	01193	04	FA	0	1
Arty NCO	13B40	E7	NC	0	1
JTD	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	0	
CAT	1 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		2

## DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY TEAM

Tm Chief	09301	04	MI	1	0
Intel Adv	G9300	04	MI	0	1
Intel/Lrrp Adv	G9301	03	MI	0	1
Intel Sgt	96B50	E8	NC	0	1
II	96D40	E7	NC	0	1
Sr OB Analyst	96B40	E7	NC	0	1
OB Analyst	96B40	E6	NC	1	3
Interrogator	96C2L	E5	NC	0	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	0	2
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	2 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL		11

## DS BATTALION ADVISORY TEAM

Log Bn Sr Adv	G2625	04	QM	1	0
Sr Maint Adv	G4815	03	OD	1	0

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DS BATTALION ADVISORY TEAM (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Sr Sup & Svc Adv	G4419	O3	QM	1	0
Engineer Maint Adv	62148	WO		1	0
Veh Maint Adv	6325H	E8	NC	1	0
Supply Adv	7625H	E8	NC	1	0
Armament Maint Adv	4524H	E7	NC	1	0
Electronic Maint Adv	31W4H	E7	NC	1	0
JTD	4 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	8	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

REGIMENTAL COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM

RCAT Comdr	G1542	O5	IN	0	3
Sr Regt Adv	G1542	O5	IN	3	0
Asst RCAT Comdr	G1542	O4	IN	0	3
Regt Staff Adv	G2162	O3	IN	3	0
G2/Lrrp Adv	G9301	O3	MI	0	3
Ops NCO	11F40	E7	NC	3 (E8)	3
Intel NCO	96B40	E7	NC	0	3
RCAT RTO	05B30	E4	NC	0	3
IS Radio Op	05B20	E4	NC	3	0
JTD	6 OFF	6 EM	TOTAL	12	
CAT	9 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL		18

BATTALION COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM

BCAT Comdr	G1542	O4	IN	9	12
Asst BCAT Comdr	G1542	O3	IN	3	12
BCAT NCO	11B4H	E7	NC	0	12

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BATTALION COMBAT ASSISTANCE TEAM (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Lt Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	9	0
BCAT NCO	11C4H	E6	NC	0	12
Hvy Wpns Inf Adv	11C4H	E6	NC	3	0
JTD	12 OFF	12 EM	TOTAL	24	
CAT	24 OFF	24 EM	TOTAL		48

RECAP OFFICER

TOTAL AUTHORIZED JTD 34  
 TOTAL AUTHORIZED CAT 51

RECAP ENLISTED

TOTAL AUTHORIZED JTD 42  
 TOTAL AUTHORIZED CAT 74

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## 23D DTA

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Sr Div Adv Det Cmdr	G1542	06	IN	1	0
Tm Cmdr	G1542	06	IN	0	1
Dep Sr Adv	G1542	05	IN	1	0
Admin Off	02120	03	AG	1	0
Dep Cmdr	G1542	05	IN	0	1
Sig Adv	G0210	03	SC	0	1
Div Sr Enl Adv	11G5H	E9	NC	1	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	1(E4)	1
	JTD	3 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	5
	CAT	3 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	5

## G-1 SEC

G1 Adv	G2260	04	IN	1	0
Sr Pers Mgt Adv	71H5H	E8	NC	1	0
Mn Pwr Adv	71H4H	E7	NC	1	0
	JTD	1 OFF	2EM	TOTAL	3
	CAT	0 OFF	0EM	TOTAL	0

## G-3 SEC

G3 Adv	G2162	05	IN	1	0
Opns Adv	G2162	05	IN	0	1
Asst G3 Adv	G1542	03	IN	2	0
Opns Off	02162	04	AR	0	1

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## G-3 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Tng Ctr Adv	G1542	O3	IN	1	1
Asst G3 Opns Adv	G2163	O3	AR	1	0
Opns Off	O2162	O3	AT	2	0
Asst Opns Off	O2162	O3	AT	0	3
Air Opns Off	O2163	O3	ADA	0	1
CH Inf Opns Adv	11F5H	E8	NC	1	0
Opns Sgt	11F50	E8	NC	0	1
Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	3 (E6)	3
Air Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	1	0
Tng Ctr NCO Adv	11F4H	E7	NC	1	0
Opns Clerk	71B30	E5	NC	0	2
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
Rad Tel Opr	O5B30	E4	NC	0	1
JTD	7 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL	14	
CAT	7 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL		14

## G-4 SEC

G4 Adv	G4010	O4	IN	1	0
Log Adv	O4010	O4	QM	0	1
Ord Adv	G4512	O3	OD	1	0
Sig Adv	O0210	O4	SC	1	0
AG Adv	G2110	O3	AG	0	1
Asst G4 Adv	G4010	O3	AR	1	0
Maint Adv	621A8	WO		0	1
Admin/Log Adv	71L40	E7	NC	0	1

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G-4 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Rn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Radio Apr Adv	31W4H	E7	NC	1	0
Trans Mvmts NCO	71N40	E7	NC	1	0
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
JTD	4 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	7	
CAT	3 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		4

## G-5 SEC

G5 Adv	G9305	04	AK	1	0
Asst G5 Adv	G2162	03	AT	1	0
JTD	2 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	2	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## INFO ADV

Info Adv	G5505	03	AT	1	1
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		1

## DIV HQ DET

Admin Spec	71L20	E5	NC	1	0
MSG Cen Clk	71B20	E4	NC	1	0
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	2	0
JTD	0 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	4	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## DET HQS Bk

Det Cmdr	02900	03	AK	1	1
Det Sgt	71L40	E8	NC	1 (E7)	1
Det XO	02900	02	AG	0	1
Det Supply Sgt	76Y40	E7	NC	1 (E6)	1

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DET HQS BR (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Mess Steward	94B40	E7	NC	1 (E6)	1
Asst. Mess Steward	94B20	E5	NC	2	2
Supply Spec	76Y20	E5	NC	1 (E4)	1
Med Supv	91B40	E6	NC	0	1
Comm Sgt	31Z40	E7	NC	0	1
PX Supv	76P40	E7	NC	0	1
Admin Sgt	71L40	E6	NC	0	1
Security Coord	11B40	E6	NC	0	1
Security Guard	11B40	E5	NC	0	2
Comm Spec	72B20	E5	NC	0	1
Clerk	71B30	E4	NC	0	1
Rad Tel Opr	05B30	E4	NC	0	3
Security Guard	11B20	E4	NC	0	16
Mail Clerk	71B10	E4	NC	1	1
PX Clerk	70B10	E4	NC	0	1
Open Mess Stwd	94E4M	E6	NC	0	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	8 EM	TOTAL	9	
CAT	2 OFF	37 EM	TOTAL		39

## SIGNAL OPERATIONS BR

CH Radio Op	05B40	E5	NC	1	0
Comm Spec	72B20	E5	NC	1	0
Is Radio Op	05B20	E4	NC	3	0
Is Radio Op	05B20	E3	NC	4	0

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SIGNAL OPERATIONS BR (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Rn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
JTD	0 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL	9	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0
<u>MED/ADV TREATMENT BRANCH</u>					
Gen Med Off	03100	03	MC	1	0
Med Adv	G3506	03	MS	1	1
CH Med Adv	91Z5H	E8	NC	1	0
Med Adv	91B4H	E7	NC	1	0
Jr Med Adv	91B4H	E6	NC	1	0
Sr Med Aidman	91B30	E5	NC	1	0
JTD	2 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	6	
CAT	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		1
<u>ENG BN ADV TM</u>					
Bn Adv	G1331	03	EN	1	0
Combat Eng Adv	12B4H	E7	NC	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL	2	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0
<u>SIG CO ADV SEC</u>					
Sig Supply Maint Adv	281A8	WO		1	0
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0
<u>ARTILLERY SEC</u>					
Div Arty Adv	G1193	04	AT	1	0
Arty Coord	01193	04	AT	0	1
Arty NCO	13B40	E7	NC	0	1

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ARTILLERY SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gn</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
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JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
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CAT	1 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		2
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## ARTY BN ADV TEAM

Bn Adv	G1193	04	AT	3	0
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Asst Bn Adv	G1153	03	AT	3	0
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Firing Btry Adv	13B4H	E7	NC	3	0
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Jr Firing Btry Adv	13B4H	E6	NC	2	0
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JTD	6 OFF	5 EM	TOTAL	11	
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CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0
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## RECON COMP ADV TM

Recon Comp Adv	G1542	02	IN	4	0
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Lt Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	4	0
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Head Opr/Recon	11B20	E4	NC	1	0
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JTD	4 OFF	5 EM	TOTAL	9	
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CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0
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## DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY TEAM

Tm Chief	09301	04	MI	1	0
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Intel Adv	09300	04	MI	0	1
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Intel Adv	09301	03	MI	2	0
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Intel Staff Off	09301	03	MI	0	1
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Intel/Lrrp Adv	09301	03	MI	0	1
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Intel/OB Off	09318	03	MI	1	0
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II Officer	09309	03	MI	1	0
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## DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY TEAM (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Interr Off	09316	03	MI	1	0
OB Off	09318	03	MI	1	0
OB Off	09318	02	MI	1	0
Intel Sgt	96B50	E8	AC	0	1
II Sgt	96D40	E7	NC	1	1
Sr OB Analyst	96B40	E7	AC	0	1
Tm Sgt	96B40	E7	NC	1	0
OB Analyst	96B40	E6	NC	0	3
Sr Interr	96C3L	E6	NC	1	0
Intell Anal	96B40	E6	NC	1	0
OB Spec	96B40	E6	NC	1	0
OB Spec	96B20	E5	NC	3	0
Interr	96C2L	E5	NC	0	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	0	2
Clerk Typist	71B20	E4	NC	2	0
Tm Clerk	71L20	E4	NC	1	0
JTD	7 Off	11 EM	TOTAL	18	
CAT	3 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL		12

### DS BATTALION ADVISORY TEAM

Log Bn Sr Adv	G2625	04	QM	1	0
Sr Maint Adv	G4815	03	OD	1	0
Sr Sup & Svc Adv	G4419	03	QM	1	0
Engineer Maint Adv	621A8	WO		1	0
Veh Maint Adv	63Z5H	E8	AC	1	0

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DS BATTALION ADVISORY TEAM (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Ba</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Supply Adv	76Z5H	E8	NC	1	0
Armament Maint Adv	45Z4H	E7	NC	1	0
Electronic Maint Adv	31W4H	E7	NC	1	0
JTD	4 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	8	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

FWD CP LN SEC

Liaison Off	02162	03	IN	0	2
Liaison NCO	11F40	E7	NC	0	1
JTD	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	0	
CAT	2 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		

REGIMENTAL COMBAT ASST TEAM

RCAT Comdr	G1542	05	IN	0	3
Sr Regt Adv	G1542	05	IN	3	0
Asst RCAT Comdr	G1542	04	IN	0	3
Regt Staff Adv	G2162	03	IN	3	0
G2/Lrrp Adv	G9301	03	MI	0	3
Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	0	3
Intel NCO	96B40	E7	NC	0	3
RCAT NTO	05B30	E4	NC	0	3
Is Radio Op	05B20	E4		3	0
JTD	6 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	9	
CAT	9 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL		18

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## BATTALION COMBAT ASST TEAM

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
BCAT Cmr	G1542	04	IN	0	12
Bn Adv	G1542	04	IN	12	0
Asst BCAT Cmr	G1542	03	IN	0	12
Asst Bn Adv	G1542	03	IN	10	0
BCAT NCO	11B4H	E7	NC	0	12
Lt Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	12	0
BCAT NCO	11C4H	E6	NC	0	12
Hvy Wpns Inf Adv	11C4H	E6	NC	12	0
JTD	22 OFF	24EM TOTAL		46	
CAT	24 OFF	24EM TOTAL			48

### RECAP OFFICERS

TOTAL AUTHORIZED JTD 73

TOTAL AUTHORIZED CAT 55

### RECAP ENLISTED

TOTAL AUTHORIZED JTD 92

TOTAL AUTHORIZED CAT 91

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<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Sgt. Ldr	G1542	06	IN	1	0
Team Cdr	G1542	06	IN	0	1
Dep Sg Adv	G1542	05	IN	1	0
Dep Cdr	G1542	05	IN	2	1
Sgt Enl Adv	11G50	E7	NC	1 (E8)	1
Admin Off	02110	03	AG	0	1
Sig Adv	G0210	03	SC	0	1
Clerk	71B30	E5		0	1

JTD    4 OFF    1 EM    TOTAL    5

CAT    2 OFF    4 EM    TOTAL

6

## G1 SECTION

G1 Adv	G2260	04	AT	1	0
Ch Clerk	71L40	E6	NC	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL	2	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## G3 SECTION

G3 Adv	G2162	04	IN	1	0
Opns Off	02162	04	AN	0	1
Asst Opns Off	02162	03	IN	0	3
G3 Air Adv	G2163	03	IN	1	0
Asst G3 Adv	G2162	03	AT	1	0

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## G3 SECTION (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Air Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	1	0
Opns Sgt	11F50	E8	NC	0	1
Opns NCO	11P40	E7	MC	0	2
Opns Clerk	71B30	E4		0	2
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4		1	0
JTD	3 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	5	
CAT	4 OFF	5 EM	TOTAL		9

## G4 SECTION

G4 Adv	G4010	O3	AR	1	0
Logistics Off	04010	O4	QM	0	1
Admin NCO	71L40	E7	NC	0	1
Log Coord	76Y40	E6	NC	0	1
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	1 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL		3

## G5 SECTION

G5 Adv	G9305	O3	AR	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## HQ DET

Det Corrir	02900	O3	AR	1	1
Det XO	02900	O2	AG	0	1
Zone Sig Adv	G0210	O3	SC	1	0
Det Sgt	71L50	E8	NC	1 (E7)	1
Gen Med Off	G3100	O3	MC	1	0

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HQ DET (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Supply Sgt	76Y40	E6	NC	1	1
Mess Stwd	94B40	E6	NC	2	1
Security Coord	11B40	E7	NC	0	1
Admin Sgt	71L40	E6	NC	0	1
Med Supv	91B40	E6	NC	0	1
Med Spec	91B20	E5		1	0
Comm Sgt	31Z40	E6	NC	0	1
Comm NCO	31W40	E7	NC	1	0
Security Guard	11B40	E5	NC	0	2
Asst Mess Stwd	94B20	E5		0	1
1st Cook	94B20	E5		2	0
Util Supv	51P40	E6	NC	1	0
Supply Spec	76Y20	E5		0	1
Clerk	71B30	E5		0	1
Clerk Typist	71B20	E4		4	2
Rad Tel. Opr	05B30	E4		0	4
Is Radio Opr	05B20	E4		4	0
Security Guard	11B20	E4		0	17

JTD 3 OFF 17 EM TOTAL 20

CAT 2 OFF 35 EM TOTAL 37

## DETACHMENT ADVISORS

Inf Opns Adv	11F5H	E8	NC	1	0
Radio Rpr Adv	31E4H	E7	NC	1	0
Engr Maint Adv	62B4H	E7	NC	1	0

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DETACHMENT ADVISORS (Cont'd)

TITLE	MOS	GR	PR	AUTH JTD	AUTH CAT
JTD	0 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## RF/PF ADVISORY SECTION

RF/PF Adv	G2162	04	AT	1	0
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## SPECIAL TACTICAL ZONE INTEL ADVISORY TEAM

Team Chief	09301	04	MI	1	0
Intel Adv	G9300	04	MI	0	1
Intel/LRRP Adv	G9301	03	MI	0	1
OB Off	09318	03	MI	1	1
CBTI Staff Off	09301	03	MI	1	0
Interr Off	09316	03	MI	1	0
Tm Sgt	96F40	E7	NC	1	0
II Sgt	96D40	E7	NC	1	1
Intel Sgt	96B50	E8	NC	0	0
SR OB Analyst	96B40	E7	NC	0	1
OB Analyst	96B40	E6	NC	0	3
Interr	96B2L	E5		1	1
Intel Anac	96B40	E6	NC	1	0
OB Spec	96B20	E5		1	0
Clerk	71B30	E5		0	2
Clerk Typist	71B20	E4		1	0
JTD	4 OFF	6 EM	TOTAL	10	
CAT	3 OFF	9 EM	TOTAL		12

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## ARTY COORD SECTION

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Arty Coord	O1193	O4	FA	0	1
Arty NCO	13B4H	E7	NC	0	2
JTD	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	0	
CAT	1 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL		3

## RECON COMP ADV TM

Recon Comp Adv	G1542	O2	IN	1	0
LT Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	1	0
Rad Opr/Reconn	11B20	E4		2	0
JTD	1 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	4	
CAT	0 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL		0

## REGIMENTAL COMBAT ASST TEAM

RCAT Cmdr	G1542	O5	IN	0	1
Sgt Regt Adv	G1542	O5	IN	1	0
Asst RCAT Cmdr	G1542	O4	IN	0	1
Regt Staff Adv	G2162	O3	IN	1	0
S2/LRRP Adv	G9301	O3	MI	0	1
Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	0	1
Intel NCO	94B40	E7	NC	0	1
RCAT RTO	O5B20	E4		0	1
Is Radio Cp	O5B20	E4		1	0
JTD	2 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	3 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL		6

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BATTALION COMBAT ASST TEAM

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
BCAT Cmdr	G1542	04	IN	0	4
Bn Adv	G1542	04	IN	4	0
Asst BCAT Cmdr	G1542	03	IN	0	4
Asst Bn Adv	G1542	03	IN	4	0
LT Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	4	0
BCAT NCO	11B4H	E7	NC	0	4
Hvy Wpns Inf Adv	11C4H	E6	NC	4	0
BCAT NCO	11C4H	E6	NC	0	4
JTD	8 OFF	8 EM	TOTAL	16	
CAT	8 OFF	8 EM	TOTAL		16

**RECAP OFFICERS**

AUTHORIZED TOTAL JTD 27

AUTHORIZED TOTAL CAT 26

**RECAP ENLISTED**

AUTHORIZED TOTAL JTD 40

AUTHORIZED TOTAL CAT 66

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<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Corps Dep Sr Adv/Gp Cmdr	00002	07	GO	1	1
Asst Dep Sr Adv	G1542	06	IN	1	1
Chief of Staff	G1542	06	IN	1	1
SGS	G1542	04	AT	1	1
Asst SGS	02110	03	AG	0	1
Aide-De-Camp	02030	02	IN	1	1
CSM	00250	E9	NC	1	1
Admin Supv	71L40	E7	NC	0	1
DSA's Driver	64A30	E5		1(E4)	1
ADSA's Driver	64A30	E4		0	1
Steno	71C20	E4		1	1
Secy/Steno	71C20	E4		1	1
Clk Typist	71B30	E4		1	1
JTD	5 OFF	5 EM	TOTAL	10	
CAT	6 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL		13

## G-1 SEC

G-1 Adv	G2260	05	AR	1	1
Dep G-1 Adv	G2260	04	AT	1	1
Admin Supv	71L4H	E7	NC	1	1
Clk Typist	71B30	E4		1	1
JTD	2 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL	4	
CAT	2 OFF	2 EM	TOTAL		4

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## PM SEC

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
MP Adv	G9100	04	MP	1	1
Phy Scty Off/Asst MP Adv	G9100	03	MP	1	0
PW Adv	G9110	04	MP	2	2
PW Opns NCO Adv	95B4H	E7	NC	2	2
Opns/Registrar	95B4H	E6	NC	1	1
PW Proc Adv	95B4H	E5	NC	2	0
Interpreter	04B30	E5		1	0
Clk Typist	71B30	E4		1	1
JTD	4 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL	11	
CAT	3 OFF	4 EM			7

## AG ADV SEC

AG Adv	G2110	04	AG	1	1
Pers Mgt Supv/Rctg	71H4H	E7	NC	1	1
Manpwr Sgt Acctg	71H4H	E7	NC	1	1
Translator	04B2L	E5	NC	0	1
JTD	1 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	1 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL		4

## ADMIN BRANCH

AG Adv	02110	04	AG	1	1
Admin Off	02110	03	AG	0	1
Admin Supv	71L40	E7	NC	1	1
Clas Rcds Supv	71L40	E7	NC	1 (E6)	1
Pers Mgt Spec	71H30	E5	NC	1	1
Legal Clerk	71D20	E5	NC	1	1

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ADMIN BRANCH (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>BK</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Class Rcds Clerk	71B20	E4	NC	2	2
Msg Cen Clerk	71B20	E4	NC	1	1
Pers Action Spec	71H20	E4	NC	1	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	2

JTD 1 OFF 9 EM TOTAL 10

CAT 2 OFF 10 EM TOTAL 12

## LN SEC

LN Officer	02120	O3	AT	1	1
LN NCO	71L40	E6	NC	1	1
Mvmt NCO	71L40	E6	NC	1	1

JTD 1 OFF 2 EM TOTAL 3

CAT 1 OFF 2 EM TOTAL 3

## SPEC SVCS SEC

Corps Spec Svcs Off	05000	O3	AG	1	0
Entertainment NCO	03B40	E6	NC	1	1
Entertainment Spec	03B20	E4	NC	1	0

JTD 1 OFF 2 EM TOTAL 3

CAT 0 OFF 1 EM TOTAL 1

## G-2 SEC

G-2 Adv	09300	O5	MI	1	1
Deputy G-2 Adv	09300	O4	MI	1	0
Dep G-2/Lrrp Adv	09300	O4	MI	0	1
IT Off	09309	O4	MI	1	0
Ops/Mid Adv	09300	O3	MI	0	1

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G-2 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gh</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Asst G-2 Ops Adv	09318	03	MI	1 (04)	1
II Off	09309	04	MI	1	0
Corps Inter Cntr Adv	G9316	03	MI	0	1
Interr Off	09316	03	MI	1	0
CI/Scty Off	09666	03	MI	0	1
OB Off	09318	03	MI	1	0
Intel Editing Off	29301	03	MI	1	0
Admin Off	02110	02	AG	1	0
Interr Off	09316	02	MI	1	0
OB Off	09318	02	MI	1	0
Ops Sgt	96B50	E8	NC	1	0
Intel NCO	96B50	E8	NC	0	1
Chief II	96D40	E7	NC	1	0
Tgt Acq NCO	96B40	E7	NC	0	1
Det Supply Sgt	76Y40	E6	NC	1	0
G-2 Air Adv	96D40	E7	NC	0	1
OB Spec	96B40	E6	NC	2	0
Sr OB Spec	96B40	E7	NC	0	1
Sr Interr	96C3L	E7	NC	1 (E6)	1
Admin Clerk	71L20	E5	NC	1	1
Intel Editor	96B20	E5	NC	1	0
OB Spec	96B20	E6	NC	2 (E5)	4
Interr	96C2L	E5	NC	1	1
II	96D20	E5	NC	1	0

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G-2 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Clk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	1	1
Clk Typist	71B20	E4	NC	3	3
JTD	11 OFF	16 EM	TOTAL	27	
CAT	6 OFF	15 EM	TOTAL		21

## G-3 SEC

G3 Adv	G2162	O5	IN	1	1
Dep G3 Adv	G2162	O4	AR	1	1
Asst G3 Ops Adv	G2162	O4	AT	1	1
Asst G3 Plans Adv	G2162	O4	IN	1	1
Asst G3 Tng Adv	G2162	O4	AR	1	1
G3 Air Adv	G2163	O4	IN	1	1
Sig Adv	00210	O4	SC	0	1
Corps Arty Adv	G1193	O5	AT	1	1
Asst Corps Arty Adv	G1193	O3	AT	2	0
Asst G3 Air	G2163	O3	AT	1	1
Chief CSCC	G1193	O5	FA	1	1
CSCC Opns Off	G1193	O3	FA	0	2
CSCC NCO	17E40	E6	NC	0	2
LN Off	01204	O3	AR	1	1
Plans Off	02162	O3	AR	1	1
Opns Off	02162	O3	AT	3	4
Chemical Adv	G7314	O3	CM	1	1
Sig Opns NCO	31250	E8	NC	1	1
CH G3 Ops	11F5H	E8	NC	1	0

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## G-3 SEC

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Admin Supv	71150	E8	NC	0	1
Ops Adv	11F5H	E8	NC	1	1
Opns NCO	11F40	E7	NC	3	3
Sig Ops Adv	3124H	E7	NC	1	1
Chemical NCO	54E40	E7	NC	0	1
G3 Tng NCO	11F40	E7	NC	0	1
Air Ops NCO	11F4C	E6	NC	1	2
LN NCO	11F40	E7	NC	0	1
Arty Intel/Ops Asst	17Z40	E6	NC	3	0
Clerk Typist	71B30	E5	NC	0	2
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	2	5
Comm Cntr Spec	72B30	E4	NC	0	1
	JTD	17 OFF	13 EM TOTAL	30	
	CAT	19 OFF	22 EM TOTAL		21

## G-4 SEC

G4 Adv Log Coord	G4010	05	AR	1	1
Engr Adv	G7010	05	EN	1	1
Dep G4 Adv	G4010	04	AR	1	1
QM Adv	G4010	04	QM	1	1
Ord Adv	G4512	04	OD	1	1
Cmm1 Adv	G4010	03	QM	0	1
Transp Mvmt Adv	G0692	03	TC	1	0
Enger Maint Adv	621A8	WO		1	1
Food Serv Supv	941A0	WO		1	1
Chief Clerk	71140	E6	NC	0	1

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## G-4 SEC

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gh</u>	<u>BK</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	0
Mvmts Supv	71N40	E6	NC	1	1
Supply Sgt	76Y40	E6	NC	1	1
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	1
JTD	8 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL	12	
CAT	8 OFF	4 EM	TOTAL		12

## COMPS ENGR/REAL ESTATE OFFICE

Corps Engr Off	07110	O3	EN	1	1
Constr Supv	51H40	E7	NC	1	1
Sr Pwr Gen Equip Rpr	52D20	E5	NC	1	1
Gen Opr	52B30	E4	NC	1	1
Mechn Spec	51L20	E4	NC	2	2
Motor & Gen Rpr	52D30	E4	NC	1	1
Clerk Typist	71F30	E4	NC	1	1
JTD	1 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL	8	
CAT	1 OFF	7 EM	TOTAL		8

## G-5 SEC

G5 Adv	G8104	O5	EN	1	1
Asst G5 Adv	G8104	O4	QM	1	1
Psywar/Civic Act Adv	G9305	O4	AT	1	0
Civil Affairs Adv	G8105	O3	FA	0	1
Relief Commod Adv	G4419	O3	QM	1	0
Civic Action Adv	G8104	O4	AR	1	0

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G-5 SEC (Cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gh</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Polwar Bn Adv	G9305	04	Ah	0	1
Psywar Bn Adv	G9305	03	Ah	1	0
Civic Action Adv	G6104	03	Ah	1	0
Chief Clerk	71140	E7	NC	1	1
Polwar Bn Adv	71140	E4	NC	0	1
Admin Spel	72120	E5	NC	1	0
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	1	1
JTD	7 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	10	
CAT	4 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL		7

## INSPECTOR GENERAL ADV SEC

Insp Gen Adv	G9310	05	IN	1	1
Sctry/Steno	71C20	E5	NC	0	1
JTD	1 OFF	0 EM	TOTAL	1	
CAT	1 OFF	1 EM	TOTAL		2

## FIELD INFORMATION OFFICE

Field Info Off	05505	04	IN	1	1
Info Supv	71D40	E6	NC	0	1
Info Tect	72170	E6	NC	1	0
Still Photographer	23671	E6	NC	1	0
Sr Still Photographer	84B20	E5	NC	0	1
Broadcast Spec	71R20	E5	NC	1	1
JTD	1 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL	4	
CAT	1 OFF	3 EM	TOTAL		4

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## SIGNAL ADVISORY SEC

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>Bk</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Signal Adv	G0210	O5	SC	1	0
Asst Signal Adv	G0210	O4	SC	1	0
Comm Cen Spec	72B20	E4	NC	1	0
JTD	2 OFF	1 E4	TOTAL	3	
CAT	0 OFF	0 E4	TOTAL		0

### DETACHMENT HQS BRANCH

Det Comdr	02900	O4	AT	1	1
Asst Det Comdr	02900	O3	QM	1	1
Det Sgt	71L50	E8	NC	1	1
Mess Steward	94B40	E7	NC	1	1
Open Mess Steward	94P40	E7	NC	1	1
Motor Sgt	63C40	E7	NC	1	1
LN NCO	71L40	E6	NC	1	0
Utilities Supv	51P40	E6	NC	1	1
Supply NCO	76Y40	E6	NC	1	1
Asst Mess Steward	94B40	E6	NC	1	1
1st Cook	94B20	E5	NC	1	1
Electrician	52F20	E4	NC	1	1
Auto Mechanic	63B20	E4	NC	1	1
Olk Typist	71B20	E4	NC	2	2
Armorer	76Y30	E4	NC	1	1
Mail Clerk	71F20	E4	NC	1	1
Supply Clerk	76Y20	E4	NC	1	1

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## DETACHMENT HQS BRANCH (cont'd)

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Gr</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
JTD	2 OFF	16 EM	TOAL	18	
CAT	2 OFF	15 EM	TOTAL		17

## SECURITY DETACHMENT II CORPS

Security NCO	14B40	E7	NC	1	1
Secirity NCO	11B40	E6	NC	3	1
Security Guard	11B40	E5	NC	7	5
Security Guard	11B20	E4	NC	39	18
JTD	0 OFF	50 EM	TOTAL	50	
CAT	0 OFF	25 EM	TOTAL		25

## RECAP II CORPS STAFF

### OFFICERS

JTD AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	65
CAT AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	57

### ENLISTED

JTD AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	144
CAT AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	123

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## 2ND RANGER GP

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH. JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Team Cmdr	G1542	05	IN	1	1
Dep Team Cmdr	G1542	04	IN	0	1
Ops Adv	G2162	03	IN	1	1
Intel/LRRP Adv	G9301	03	MI	0	1
Arty LNO	01193	03	FA	0	1
Ops/Intel Adv	11F4H	E7	NC	1	0
Ops/NCO	11F5H	E8	NC	0	1
Intel Adv	96B4H	E7	NC	0	1
Med Adv	91B4H	E7	NC	0	1
Comm Chief	31Z40	E6	NC	0	1
Rad Tel Opr	05B30	E4	NC	0	4
JTD	20FF	1EM	TOTAL	3	
CAT	50FF	8EM	TOTAL		13

## RANGER BN ADV

Bn Adv	G1542	04	IN	3	3
Asst Bn Adv	G1542	03	IN	3	3
LT Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E6	NC	3	3
Ops/Intel Adv	11B4H	E6	NC	3	3
JTD	60FF	6EM	TOTAL	12	
CAT	60FF	6EM	TOTAL		12

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## ARM CAV SQDN ADVISOR

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Squadron Adv	G1204	04	AR	3	3
Troop Adv M113	G1204	03	AR	6	6
Troop Adv M41	G1203	03	AR	3	3
Armor Opns Adv M113	11D4H	E7	NC	6	6
Armor Opns Adv M41	11D4H	E7	NC	3	3
Maint Adv M41	63C4H	E7	NC	3	3
JTD	12OFF	12EM	TOTAL	24	
CAT	12OFF	12EM	TOTAL		24

## SIGNAL ADV TMS

Sig Bn Adv	G0210	03	SC	1	0
Ch Sig Adv	31Z4H	E7	NC	1	0
JTD	10FF	1EM	TOTAL	2	
CAT	00FF	0EM			0

## RF BN ADV TM

RF Bn Adv	G2162	04	IN	1	1
LT Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	1	1
JTD	10FF	1EM	TOTAL	2	
CAT	10FF	1EM	TOTAL		2

## HIGHLAND SCOUT ADV SECTION

Scout Co Adv	G1542	02	IN	12	7
Opns/Intel Adv	11F4H	E7	NC	13	7
LT Wpns Inf Adv	11B4H	E7	NC	10	0
JTD	12OFF	23EM	TOTAL	35	
CAT	70FF	7EM	TOTAL		14

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## ARTY Bn ADV TM

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>AUTH JTD</u>	<u>AUTH CAT</u>
Bn Adv	G1193	O4	FA	4	2
Asst Bn Adv	G1193	O3	AT	2	2
Firing Btry Adv	13B4H	E7	NC	4	2
Firing Btry Adv	13B4H	E5	NC	4	2
	JTD	6OFF	8EM	TOTAL	14
	CAT	4OFF	4EM	TOTAL	8

## ENGINEER Bn ADV

Corps Dep Sr Engr Adv	G1331	O4	EN	6	1
Combat Engr Gp Adv	G1331	O4	EN	1	0
Div/Bn Engr LNO	G1331	O4	EN	0	1
Combat Engr Adv	G1331	O3	EN	3	0
Engr Maint Adv	G21A8	WO		1	1
Engr Maint Adv	G2B4H	E7	NC	1	1
Engr Maint Adv	G2B4H	E7	NC	0	2
Clerk Typist	71B30	E4	NC	0	1
Jr Engr Maint Adv	G2B4H	E6	NC	2	0
	JTD	5OFF	3EM	TOTAL	8
	CAT	3OFF	4EM	TOTAL	7

## RECAP COMPS TROOP

### OFFICERS

JTD AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	45
CAT AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	38

### ENLISTED

JTD AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	55
CAT AUTHORIZED	TOTAL	42

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## ANNEX D (Artillery)

### 1. (C) ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT.

a. Organization. The 23d Division has all of its authorized artillery units: three 105mm howitzer battalions and one attached 155mm howitzer battalion. The 22d Division has two organic 105mm howitzer battalions and one attached 155mm howitzer battalion. The 223d Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzer) is currently undergoing activation training and is scheduled for deployment to the 22d Division on 27 December 1969. Corps Artillery consists of one 105mm howitzer battalion and three 155mm howitzer battalions, with an additional 105mm howitzer battalion scheduled for activation on 1 January 1970 and deployment on 15 May 1970. One 105mm howitzer battalion and one 155mm howitzer battalion from II Corps Artillery are currently attached to the 24th Special Tactical Zone, which is not authorized organic artillery. Since ARVN does not have organic heavy artillery, maneuver units must often rely on US artillery units for the longer range 8" and 175mm artillery support. Army-wide expansion of ARVN artillery units has had a debilitating effect on existing artillery units in that experienced personnel are being levied from deployed battalions to form the cadres for new units. Accordingly, artillery platoons, which are often independently deployed, are normally commanded by aspirant officers who lack the necessary experience.

b. Employment. In addition to supporting ARVN combat forces, the division and corps artillery units provide support to the territorial RF/PF forces. Artillery missions vary from direct support of infantry and armor maneuver units to attachment and direct support to sectors (provinces) and subsectors (districts) in a territorial defense role. In order to cover by fire the key lines of communication and important population centers, ARVN artillery units are often deployed in platoon increments. Consequently, each platoon provides its own fire direction center capability. These fire direction centers, however, are normally manned by personnel from the two survey teams organic to each artillery battalion, which decreases the survey capability of the battalion. Additionally, the lack of organic air assets makes supervision of the dispersed artillery platoons by battery, battalion, and division artillery commanders extremely difficult. However, ARVN artillery units have consistently proven themselves to be viable, extremely responsive, and technically proficient. The high degree of proficiency the units demonstrate is best attested to by the increased reliance placed on ARVN artillery by ARVN infantry commanders.

2. (C) COORDINATION WITH FWMAF. To insure maximum coverage of the battlefield and to prevent needless duplication of firepower, combined fire support coordination centers (CFSCC) have been established throughout II Corps. In the 22d Division tactical area, permanent CFSCCs have been established at LZ English, Bong Son, Ba Gi, Tuy Hoa, and Cheo Reo.

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The CFSCC at Ba Gi and Tuy Hoa has ROK representation in addition to US and ARVN. Within the 23d Division tactical area, CFSCCs are located in Darlac, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, and Tuyen Duc Provinces. CFSCCs have been established at Tan Canh, Kontum, and Pleiku in the 24th Special Tactical Zone. When a US artillery unit operates within an ARVN area of operations, the US unit is asked to provide a liaison officer to the ARVN fire support coordination center. This liaison officer and the US element in the CFSCC assist in the integration of US and ARVN artillery fires.

3. (C) AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS. As increased helicopter assets became available in 1969 to support ARVN forces and infantry units became more mobile and aggressive, operations were conducted in enemy base areas far from static artillery firing positions. To increase artillery coverage on the battlefield, it was necessary to utilize the mobile fire support base concept wherein artillery firing units are displaced to new locations by cargo helicopters. For this purpose, ARVN artillery units were issued sufficient sling equipment to airlift simultaneously one platoon per battalion. Artillery units having direct support missions to infantry regiments are currently experienced and proficient, having participated in many air-mobile operations. Units tasked to support the territorial defense forces, however, have little experience.

#### 4. (C) US EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ARVN ARTILLERY.

a. Associate Battery Program. During the past year, ARVN artillery units have substantially improved basic artillery operations as a result of the Associate Battery Program. US units have provided survey and metro data to ARVN artillery units and have assisted in the training of forward observers, fire direction center personnel, and gun section crews. Technical maintenance assistance has also been provided as requested.

b. Crater Analysis. To increase intelligence gathering capabilities and to insure better security, the II Corps advisory group initiated a program in October to train ARVN artillery officers and NCOs in crater analysis. Crater analysis training, incorporated in the POI at the division training centers, also included the proper method of establishing counter battery maps at artillery platoon locations.

c. Mat Evaluation System. Assisting the II Corps artillery advisor are two artillery combat assistance teams (ACAT), each composed of one major, one captain, one SFC, and one SSG. The teams are designated ACAT North and ACAT South. ACAT North, based in Pleiku, assists ARVN artillery units in the 22d Division tactical area and the 24th Special Tactical Zone. ACAT South, stationed in Ban Me Thuot, assists organic and attached ARVN artillery units in the 23d Division tactical area. The mission of the two teams is to evaluate the combat effectiveness of ARVN artillery units and to provide advisory assistance when required. Accordingly, frequent inspections of artillery units are conducted. Inspection reports are forwarded through the corps artillery advisor to the II Corps artillery officer for appropriate corrective action.

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## Annex E (Personnel)

1. GENERAL. At the beginning of 1969, personnel services and personnel management, to include strength accounting and distribution of personnel resources, were not geared to take into account the rapid increase in the strength of ARVN troops within II Corps which took place in the 2d half of CY 1968. Much improvement has been made during CY 1969 in the foregoing areas as well as in the areas of desertion control, leadership development, and military police activities; however, much remains to be done. Each of the key personnel areas is reviewed below.

### 2. STRENGTHS.

a. General. Authorized strengths of II Corps units increased during CY 1969 resulting from the addition of the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron; the 4th Battalion, 53d Regiment; and activation of an additional Artillery battalion in both the 22d and the 23d Divisions. Other newly formed units in II Corps are discussed in Annex D. II Corps assigned strength generally has remained at 90% of its authorized strength throughout the period. Regimental units, however, have had periods of low strengths. Due to heavy combat losses sustained during the Dak To - Ben Het campaign in May and June, the 42d Separate Regiment and the 2d Ranger Group dropped to 84% and 78% of their authorized strengths, respectively. Even though the 42d Regiment was given a high priority on replacement fills by the Joint General Staff (JGS), the flow of replacements was slow. By the end of October, however, the 42d Regiment was at 98% of authorized strength and the 2d Ranger Group was at 87% of its authorized strength. II Corps, as a whole, was at 92% of its authorized strength of 44,883 at the end of October.

b. Strength Reporting. Currently the ARVN JGS requires two types of strength reports. The first is the QD 22 strength report which is equivalent of the US Army's morning report, although it is submitted weekly rather than daily as in the US Army. The second report is the ARVN G1 Personnel Strength Summary which is submitted every 5 days. These reports, prepared at regimental level, and forwarded to division, corps, and JGS serve as source documents for personnel strength planning. Neither report, however, provides timely personnel strength and casualty data. This inadequacy was highlighted during the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign when heavy casualties were often experienced by units in a matter of a few hours. Because the 5 day reporting cycle did not accurately reflect the significant casualties suffered almost daily in this vicious, prolonged campaign, senior commanders were unable to make accurate assessments of the combat effectiveness of the engaged units. In order to correct this unsatisfactory situation, II Corps

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Advisory Group urged the Corps Commander to adopt a system of daily strength reporting within II Corps. The proposed system was approved and placed into effect on 30 August 1969. As a result, strength statistics available at all levels of command are now, at the most, 48 hours old in contrast to previous availability of data 6 to 8 days old -- thus markedly improving strength accountability and planning. This headquarters has recommended that a daily strength accounting system be adopted throughout the ARVN.

## c. Strength Procurement.

(1) The JGS allocates manpower to II Corps units in accordance with their annual assignment plan. This plan not only provides quotas for local recruitment by II Corps units, but schedules the balance of the input to II Corps from the national training centers. Current JGS directives specify that requisitions for replacements will be submitted quarterly to JGS by organic Corps units; however, since the mobilization and rapid expansion of RVNAF in 1968, JGS has relied on the QD 22 strength reporting system for projecting vacancies and replacement fills. As indicated in paragraph b above, an important lesson learned from the Ben Het - Dak To Campaign was that this system is not geared to provide for sudden and heavy combat losses. Particularly significant is the fact that no officer or noncommissioned officer replacements were received by the units engaged in the campaign during the critical period of 5 May through 5 June 1969 because the ARVN replacement pipeline did not contain sufficient quantities of trained personnel.

(2) The II Corps advisory staff has recommended actions to improve the ARVN replacement system. First, JGS should study the feasibility of establishing national and/or regional replacement pools of personnel who have completed training and can be rapidly assigned to combat units. Second, JGS and II Corps must study the possibility of discarding the present quarterly requisitioning cycle and establish a monthly cycle which will provide JGS with more current personnel requirements. The third recommendation is that ARVN develop and use Casualty Loss Rate Tables as a basis for projecting losses. Finally, the development of a contingency reassignment plan for replacing sudden officer and noncommissioned losses is necessary. This plan would provide a ready reserve of officer and noncommissioned officer assets that could be reassigned on a short notice, short term basis to any unit suffering critical loss of leaders.

## 3. DESERTION.

a. During the past year, desertions have constituted the major drain on ARVN fighting strength in II Corps. The rate per thousand for regular force troops in II Corps has varied every month; the highest rates occurred in February (19 per 1000) and July (19.7 per 1000). The low points were in January (12.1 per 1000), March (12.4 per 1000), and May (12.6 per 1000).

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The 22d Division has consistently maintained the lowest desertion rate, with the rate in April (9.8 per 1000) and May (10 per 1000) being the lowest among all ARVN divisions in RVN.

b. The 42d Separate Regiment and the 2d Ranger Group, both stationed in the Central Highlands, have continuously experienced the highest desertion rates within II Corps. During June and July, the 42d Regiment's rate was 59.7 and 57.4 per 1000; while the 2d Ranger Group reached its peak in April and June with a rate of 70.9 and 66.8 per 1000, respectively. During the first nine months of 1969, the 2d Ranger Group lost 770 of its troops to desertion or 41% of its average assigned strength; while the 42d Regiment lost 834 troops, or 30% of its average assigned strength.

c. There is unanimous agreement that the major causes of desertion are poor leadership at the small unit level, lack of or poor dependent and troop housing, lack of adequate commissary and PX supplies, family separation, and -- for troops stationed in the Central Highlands -- the added factors of the high cost of living, inadequate dependent schools, and harsh, hazardous combat conditions.

d. The advisory effort has continued to stress measures to reduce desertions. A monthly desertion report keeps advisors at all levels apprized of the magnitude of the desertion problem. A II Corps Desertion Control Committee, consisting of the principal staff officers and their advisors and chaired by the Deputy Corps Commander, was formed in late 1968 and has done much to further Corps counter-desertion measures. The committee studies the causes of desertion, recommends programs to eliminate these causes, and provides central direction in matters of welfare and morale. Results of committee meetings are submitted to the Corps Commander and serve as the basis for anti-desertion policies and actions. In March 1969, similar committees were formed at division and regimental level. The Corps Desertion Control Committee and the Corps Deserter and Draft Dodger Apprehension Committee were combined in June 1969. As a result, a new police patrol plan for the entire corps has been established and the efforts of the Military Police, National Police, Military Security Service, and local officials are now centrally coordinated. In addition, deserter and draft dodger apprehension quotas have been established for each province and joint patrols are used to round them up.

e. The above-mentioned measures are the actions taken at II Corps, but they are not ends in themselves. What is required is the establishment of a program at the national level aimed at improving personnel services for the ARVN soldier. This will involve allocating more funds and resources for dependent housing, increasing the flow of commissary supplies, increasing the cost of living allowance paid to soldiers in the Central Highlands, and increasing the availability of transportation for soldiers going on leave. The foregoing recommendations have been submitted to the Commanding General, II Corps.

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### 4. LEADERSHIP.

a. Leadership throughout II Corps has generally been adequate down to regimental level; however, the shortage of experienced battalion and company level officers resulting from the second ARVN expansion is a continuous problem affecting the performance of battalions and their subordinate units. Poor leadership also contributes to the desertion problem. Upgrading of the ARVN junior leaders' performance has received continued advisor attention. English translations of the "ARVN Small Unit Commanders Handbook" and "Handbook on Authority and Responsibility of Rifle Company Commander and Rifle Platoon Leader" were furnished to advisors in April 1969 for use in discussion with their counterparts on improving leadership techniques. During May 1969, an Army Digest article on leadership was translated into Vietnamese and distributed to ARVN regular force units. Advisors were also furnished a list of US Army films on leadership that are available in the Vietnamese language. Junior leader training programs designed to correct shortcomings are conducted at the 22d and 23d Division training centers (see Annex C, Organization and Training.) These measures will provide a limited degree of relief, but action is required at JGS level to examine carefully the current curriculum at all ARVN schools with a view to emphasizing courses which contribute directly to the production of immediately employable and effective junior leaders. In addition, ARVN must increase its flexibility in the utilization of company level leaders. This headquarters has recommended to the Commanding General, II Corps that he develop plans for the rapid reassignment of experienced and qualified officers and NCOs to units which have sustained abrupt critical losses in order to maintain their combat effectiveness.

b. In addition to the shortage of officers, there is a related strength imbalance within the officer grade structure. This problem stems from the past inability of the RVNAF officer production and promotion system to keep pace with the rapid mobilization and associated increases in force levels. The problem is compounded by the fact that the main officer input has necessarily been at the bottom of the grade structure, resulting in an overstrength in lieutenant grades and an understrength in all other grades. The JGS has introduced measures designed to correct this deficiency. These measures include expanding officer production sources and substantially increasing officer promotions. Emergency measures include convening a special supplemental promotion board for 1969 and temporarily removing the requirement for a minimum number of points to qualify for promotion. Emphasis has also been placed on promoting personnel who have distinguished themselves by exceptional service or have performed outstandingly on the field of battle. These special and battlefield promotions waive the necessity of meeting the requirements prescribed for regular annual promotion. The above-mentioned promotion policies are gradually permitting deserving and capable men to become officers and to assume positions of responsibility and leadership within RVNAF.

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5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS. In December 1968, II Corps Advisory Group launched a program designed to stimulate command interest in decorations and awards as a means of increasing unit morale and effectiveness through the recognition not only of outstanding acts of valor, but also distinguished achievement and service. This increase in advisory efforts has produced notable success. The number of ARVN awards presented in II Corps during the first half of 1969 was 8,617 as compared with 4,681 presented during the first half of 1968. Significant improvement was reflected in the number of certificates of achievement and commendation presented, which increased from 299 during the first half of 1968 to 4,201 during the first half of 1969. The role which an effective awards and decorations program can play in building and maintaining ARVN morale will be accorded continuing emphasis by all advisors.

6. MILITARY POLICE. ARVN Military Police activities throughout II CTZ improved during the past year. Prior to January 1969 one battalion, the 2nd QC Battalion in Pleiku, had the police mission for the entire corps. The organization of the 11th QC Battalion at Nha Trang in December 1968 and its assumption of operational responsibilities in Southern II Corps contributed to the improvement. During 1969 ARVN Military Police developed a stronger rapport with the National Police at sector level. This resulted in increased combined patrols for the apprehension of AWOLs and deserters. Continued emphasis is being placed on combined patrol activities in all sectors in II Corps. Another contribution to increased effectiveness of ARVN Military Police has been the provision of comprehensive refresher training by US Military Police instructors.

7. PRISONER OF WAR ACTIVITIES.

a. Two POW installations are maintained and operated in II CTZ. A male POW facility is located at Pleiku while a female POW facility is at Qui Nhon. Each of these camps maintained an average population of 1,000 inmates during the past year.

b. The capability of ARVN MP units to receive, secure, segregate, and maintain a long-term prison population has increased steadily throughout the period of this report. Work programs and occupational instruction have begun; however, the period saw only 72% of the male POW population and 22% of the female POW population gainfully employed during an average month.

c. There are two programs which must be implemented in order to overcome two major problem areas. First, action must be initiated to construct permanent internment camps to replace the present deteriorated war-time construction. More importantly, it is vital to the future of South Vietnam that a rehabilitation program be initiated which will permit the internees to reenter the population. Some progress was made in 1969 with the repatriation of 67 POWs.

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## Annex F (Logistics)

1. GENERAL. The II Corps logistics system has functioned effectively during the period. As a case in point, it withstood the test of the prolonged, bitterly fought Dak To - Ben Het Campaign. The principal II Corps deficiency in the logistics area is a general failure to include logistical considerations in operational planning. This problem and other problems discussed below demonstrate a requirement for increased command emphasis at all levels in logistics matters.
2. LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE. The problems brought to light by the MACV Logistics Offensive are being used as a basis to increase both efficiency and self-reliance of the II Corps logistical system. The first priority in II Corps is to improve the quality and training of logisticians at the staff level and supply and maintenance personnel at the unit level. However, some time will be required before measurable results can be attained. The next priority is to emphasize actions that will increase ARVN command interest in logistics at all levels.
3. FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE UNITS. ARVN forces in II Corps have been substantially strengthened during the past year as a result of the Force Structure Increase Program. To date this increase includes seven new battalion sized combat units and eleven support units (see paragraph 1, Annex C. Seven support units not listed are ALC units.) Each division has a new Direct Support Logistics Battalion assigned, while a Signal and Medical Group are operating at Corps level. Shortages of trained personnel and specialized equipment as well as the late receipt of TO&Es are problems which are continually encountered and which delay the orderly deployment of fully operational units. These problems, however, are being resolved as rapidly as can reasonably be expected.
4. MODERNIZATION.
  - a. Weapons Modernization. The two primary weapons in the ARVN modernization program are the M60 machine gun and the M16 rifle. The introduction of these two new weapons has raised the morale of the ARVN soldier, increased his firepower, lightened his individual load, and reduced the weight and variety of his ammunition support. Both programs have progressed ahead of schedule. The M16 program, originally scheduled for completion on 1 March 1970, is essentially complete. The M60 machine gun program is expected to be complete by the end of the first quarter, CY 70. All ARVN maneuver elements in II CTZ have been issued both the M60 machine gun and the M16 rifle. As of 1 November 1969 the II Corps M16 rifle fill and M60 machine gun fill, to include RF/PF forces, were at 95 percent and 81 percent respectively.

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b. Vehicle Modernization. Two new vehicles, the M151A1  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck and the M35A2  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck, are being added to the ARVN inventory and will become the ARVN military standard vehicles. The M151A1 will replace the off-shore procured Japanese 3JC and the US commercial M606. The M35A2 will replace the Japanese M602  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck. These standardization vehicles will reduce the variety of equipment to be maintained and supported. The current percentage of fill is 58 percent and 32 percent for M151A1s and M35A2s, respectively. Both programs are scheduled for completion by the end of FY 70.

c. Signal Equipment. A modernization program has been initiated to replace the AN/PRC 8, 9, and 10 with the AN/PRC-25, in both ARVN regular force units and RF/PF units. This program is progressing on schedule with the percent of fill being 86 percent and 41 percent in ARVN and RF/PF, respectively. The program is scheduled for completion by the end of FY 70.

5. AERIAL RESUPPLY. Aerial supply of ARVN tactical units in II Corps has been accomplished through air landing of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Although a parachute rigger capability exists at national level, a requirement has not been generated for its use within II Corps. Corps organizations have sufficient training and enough sling equipment on hand to resupply units under most tactical conditions. With respect to artillery deployment, Headquarters, II Corps has submitted a request to JGS for an increase of sling sets from two per artillery battalion to six per battalion in order to permit a tactical lift of one complete battery per battalion.

6. FOOD SERVICE. Traditional within ARVN has been and is to provide the individual purchase of supplements. However, these supplemental rations are provided to combat elements in the event ration purchases are not available. As a result of this practice, ARVN has resisted the establishment of sophisticated and closely monitored mess operations similar to the US Food Service System. In view of ARVN satisfaction with their traditional food service arrangements, there is no apparent reason to press for adjustment at this time. The ARVN combat ration is used only under duress as most ARVN soldiers do not like it. Improvement in the ARVN combat ration would, therefore, not only improve morale but lighten resupply loads during operations.

7. AMMUNITION. During the reporting period, ARVN has improved effective management of ammunition to all echelons of command. The general trend has been to reduce the amount of ammunition held in reserve at Area Logistics Command depots for combat emergencies and to increase the II Corps available supply rate to a more realistic level. Combat emergency requirements for ammunition have therefore become negligible. ARVN units are operating on a realistic ammunition supply rate. Intensive management is exercised only when a particular type of ammunition is in short supply. The required supply rates reflect competent planning based on actual expenditure data. Emergencies resulting from a shortage of ammunition or deficiencies in the ARVN ammunition supply system have been essentially eliminated.

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8. POL. The ARVN POL supply system lacked responsiveness early in the period as evidenced by reliance on US support facilities for rapid response. Gradually, however, the ARVN system has approached self-reliance, with emphasis being placed on proper requisitioning through ARVN channels and realistic forecasting of requirements .

9. TRANSPORTATION. The II Corps Tactical Zone has made great improvements in the area of transportation. Unit movements by air are normally planned well in advance and requests are sent through either II Corps or the Area Logistic Commands (ALCS) to the Joint General Staff (JGS) for final approval. In addition to air movement, ground movement is always considered as an alternate transportation means.

### 10. MEDICAL.

a. All Medical activities are rapidly approaching Vietnamization except aeromedical evacuation. Two helicopters are available daily for this purpose from the single VNAF helicopter squadron supporting II Corps. Pending relocation of the present squadron from Nha Trang to the Highlands, or deployment of additional squadrons to II CTZ, heavy reliance on US helicopter ambulance units will continue.

b. During the later part of September 1968, 160 cases of malaria were reported among personnel of the 45th Regiment in the Duc Lap area. Virtually no preventive measures had been taken. Subsequent to an inspection by the II Corps Surgeon, members of his staff, and the II Corps Senior Medical Advisor, the following preventive measures were taken:

- (1) Enforced administration of malaria pills. (Chloroquine/Primaquine)
- (2) Use of insect repellent and aerosol spray.
- (3) Insecticide spraying of compounds with jeep-mounted "foggers".
- (4) Issuance of mosquito nets.
- (5) Aerial insecticide spraying by the Air Force.

Shortly thereafter the high incidence of malaria subsided. No serious outbreaks have occurred this year.

### 11. DEPENDENT HOUSING.

a. Government funds were allocated to alleviate the serious shortage of dependent housing. The program stalled until JGS raised cost per unit to match the inflation rate within the Corps area. In CY 69 a total of 1690 units were allotted to II Corps. Of these 440 were cancelled by JGS. The remaining 1250 are under construction or awaiting contracts.

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b. To augment the GVN program, US and ARVN units inaugurated a Dependent Housing Self-Help Program to build 920 units. The completion of 481 units exhausted all possible sources of salvageable material. New construction will not be initiated until the 160 units currently under construction are completed.

### 12. ENGINEER.

a. The 20th Engineer Group (Combat) consists of three combat battalions and five separate companies. The combat battalions are committed on LOC work (50%), construction of class B outposts (20%), and combat and operational support (30%). The separate companies (2 panel bridge, 1 float bridge, 1 dump truck, and 1 light equipment company) perform special missions and assist the combat battalions. The 6th Engineer Group (Construction), which is controlled by JGS, consists of 3 construction battalions and 2 separate companies. Two battalions are committed on vertical construction (58%) and earth moving (15%). One battalion was activated on 1 August 1969 and is still being equipped and trained. The separate companies (1 heavy equipment company and 1 dump truck company) perform special missions and assist the construction battalions. The 22d and 23d Engineer Battalions and one company of 20th Group supporting 24th STZ provide organic combat and operational support (67%), and vertical construction (33%).

b. To improve the quality of ARVN Engineer units, an affiliation program has been initiated between US and ARVN Engineer units. The US 35th and 937th Engineer Groups have "paired off" with the ARVN 6th and 20th Engineer Groups, and the divisional battalions. An OJT program has been provided by US units for engineer equipment not yet issued to the ARVN units and paired units join in work on the LOCs. The affiliation program has produced a demonstrable increase in the capabilities of the ARVN units through the training, equipment, and materials received.

c. To replace the US Engineer units as they are withdrawn from the Highlands, the movement of the 202nd Engineer Battalion (-) from the Dalat area to the Pleiku area is programmed for early 1970.

### 13. PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Maintenance. Because of lack of command emphasis in II Corps on maintenance discipline, ARVN has practiced "after the fact" repair and replacement. The failure to inaugurate a preventive maintenance program with a resultant high deadline rate was cited early in the year to the Corps Commander in an endeavor to "sell" him on the concept of a command maintenance management inspection (CMMI). Although he agreed in concept, the implementation has been beset by a multitude of staffing delays. Part of these resulted from a less than enthusiastic approach by the II Corps staff to a concept which was new to ARVN. Additional delays were encountered in obtaining JGS approval and direction. The JGS directive when published was ambiguous and failed to clearly delineate II Corps responsibilities. After considerable

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effort by the advisory staff in clarifying the JGS directive, II Corps Headquarters finally published, on 16 October 1969, a directive implementing the CMMI Program effective 1 December 1969. If utilized effectively, this CMMI Program has the potential for correcting the fundamental deficiencies in the ARVN maintenance management program.

b. Repair Parts. A problem of major proportions developed as a direct result of the introduction of new materiel and equipment, primarily the M151  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle, into the ARVN inventory without concurrent spare parts distribution to using units. This action caused excessive deadline rates and caused vehicles to be operated that should have been deadlined for such fundamental items as replacement oil filters. This deficiency was identified by II Corps and provided as input to the Joint Combined Logistics Offensive FY 69. JGS/CLC was assigned action responsibility to correct this deficiency which was promptly resolved by the shipment of most concurrent spare parts to the Area Logistics Command Depots.

c. Mission Essential Equipment. A continuing problem is shortage of mission essential equipment. Most of the critical shortages are found in the new Force Structure Increase Units (See para 1a, Annex C) and reflect poor logistical planning in the activation and deployment phase of these units. One of the fundamental mistakes has been activation of units without approved TOEs.



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## ANNEX G (Political Warfare)

1. GENERAL. ARVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) programs within II Corps Tactical Zone during calendar year 1969 showed improvement in activities directed toward the three POLWAR target audiences: RVNAF forces, the civilian populace, and enemy forces. Improvements resulted both from better coordination of existing programs and the development of new programs. Specific POLWAR programs within each target audience area are discussed in the paragraphs below. Recommendations for further improvement in POLWAR programs are included in the final paragraph.

### 2. POLWAR ACTIVITIES: RVNAF.

a. New Horizons Plan. The New Horizons Plan is a comprehensive program for ARVN unit improvement which was first developed by the General Political Warfare Department in 1967. The plan is divided into three phases: Phase I - Preparation; Phase II - Implementation; and Phase III - Continuation. During Phase I, unit staffs make a detailed survey of shortcomings in the functional areas of Administration, Intelligence, Operations/Training, Logistics, and Political Warfare. Phase II is devoted to intensive efforts by commanders and staffs to resolve problems surfaced by the Preparation Phase. A key to the plan's effectiveness is the provision for each battalion to be given a one-month stand-down during Phase II. This stand-down thus frees the unit from other commitments and allows them to concentrate all efforts on completion of the tasks of the New Horizons Plan. During the final phase, unit staffs evaluate the progress achieved and seek continued improvement in all functional areas. Two regiments, the 42d and 44th, of II Corps Tactical Zone have participated in this New Horizons Plan during the past year. The 44th Regiment completed the Implementation Phase on 31 October 1969. Initial reports indicate that significant progress was achieved in each of the five functional areas. Insufficient time has elapsed, however, to permit measurement of the long-term benefits of the program. The 42d Regiment, currently participating in the Implementation Phase of New Horizons, is scheduled to complete the final phase of the plan by 31 March 1970.

b. Other Activities. Political Indoctrination training at II Corps has made a major contribution toward stability within RVNAF. During 1969 the following political cadres were trained at II Corps Headquarters: 199 ARVN soldiers, 223 CIDG soldiers, and 145 RF soldiers. These cadres became the POLWAR NCOs at company level and are the keystone of the POLWAR concept within RVNAF. Other sub-divisions of the POLWAR staff targeted toward RVNAF include the Social Welfare Department, the Information/Press Division and the Chaplain's Department. The activities of these elements have an important impact on RVNAF within the limits of current Vietnamese funding authorizations (see para 5, Recommendation.)

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3. POLWAR ACTIVITIES: CIVILIAN POPULACE. Prior to calendar year 1969, ARVN participation in civic action was limited and often consisted solely of construction projects for ARVN dependents. During the past year, ARVN has become increasingly aware of the need for better civilian-military relationships. Beginning in May 1969, the II Corps POLWAR staff developed and implemented a civic action training course for NCOs from ARVN regiments and interpreter pools. The trained interpreters are considered reserve civic action cadres who will revert to ARVN control in the event of redeployment of Free World Armed Forces from II Corps Tactical Zone. The trained NCOs from ARVN regiments have been used as the nucleus for formation of new ARVN Civic Action Teams. Since September 1969 these newly-formed teams have been actively participating in civic action activities in support of pacification throughout II Corps Tactical Zone. Despite ARVN's recognition of the benefits of civic action, the lack of adequate funds to support an effective corps-wide civic action program may hamper the entire program. II Corps Advisory Group requested contingency US funding for the final months of 1969, but long range resolution of the problems must originate from within ARVN (see para 5, Recommendation.)

4. POLWAR ACTIVITIES: ENEMY FORCES. ARVN efforts in Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) were improved during 1969 by the formation of tri-national PSYOP coordinating organizations. A joint memorandum requires that all PSYOP/PSYWAR policies within II Corps Tactical Zone be developed by a committee made up of representatives from ARVN, ROK, and US forces. In addition, all PSYOP/PSYWAR missions are cleared through one of two Regional PSYOP Coordinating Centers. The center in Nha Trang receives and processes all ARVN, ROK, and US requests for PSYOP missions within the Coastal provinces. All ARVN and US requests within the Highland provinces are received and processed in Pleiku. Two substantial advantages of these procedures are:

a. All ARVN, ROK, and US PSYOP content receives a final check by Vietnamese personnel.

b. The II Corps area receives maximum PSYOP coverage without extensive overlap.

The continued operation of these PSYOP coordinating organizations and the similar organizations now operating in each sector should provide for further improvement in the ARVN PSYWAR effort within II Corps Tactical Zone.

5. RECOMMENDATION. The ARVN POLWAR staffs at corps, division, and regiment are severely handicapped by a lack of sufficient funds to support POLWAR activities directed toward the civilian populace. The activities of the Social Welfare Department, the Information/Press Division, and the Chaplain's Department are limited because the funds available from the national level are not adequate to meet the needs of ARVN personnel and dependents. Also, as previously indicated, the civic action program developed within II Corps Tactical Zone during 1969 is limited in scope because of inadequate funds.

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Headquarters, II CTZ has recommended that JGS increase funding for POLWAR programs for both RVNAF and the civilian populace in order to provide the impact which will contribute toward a successful Vietnamization of the war.

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